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Applying statistical tools to help understand business processes and make
informed business decisions has attracted enormous amount of research interests in
recent years. In this dissertation, we develop and apply data mining techniques
to two sources of data, online bidding data for eBay and offline sales transaction
data from a grocery product distributor. We mine online auction data to develop
forecasting models and bidding strategies and mine offline sales transaction data to
investigate sales people’s price formation process.
We start with discussing bidders’ bidding strategies in online auctions. Con-
ventional bidding strategies do not help bidders select an auction to bid on. We
propose a automated and data-driven strategy which consists of a dynamic fore-
casting model for auction closing price and a bidding framework built around this
model to determine the best auction to bid on and the best bid amount.
One important component of our bidding strategy is a good forecasting model.
We investigate forecasting alternatives in three ways. Firstly, we develop model
selection strategies for online auctions (Chapter 3). Secondly, we propose a novel
functional K-nearest neighbor (KNN) forecaster for real time forecasting of online
auctions (Chapter 4). The forecaster uses information from other auctions and
weighs their contribution by their relevance in terms of auction features. It improves
the predictive performance compared to several competing models across various
levels of data heterogeneity. Thirdly, we develop a Beta model (Chapter 5) for
capturing auction price paths and find this model has advantageous forecasting
capability.
Apart from online transactions, we also employ data mining techniques to
understand offline transactions where sales representatives (salesreps) serve as media
to interact with customers and quote prices. We investigate the mental models for
salesreps’ decision making, and find that price recommendation makes salesreps
concentrate on cost related information.
In summary, the dissertation develops various data mining techniques for busi-
ness data. Our study is of great importance for understanding auction price for-
mation processes, forecasting auction outcomes, optimizing bidding strategies, and
identifying key factors in sales people’s decision making. Those techniques not only
advance our understanding of business processes, but also help design business in-
frastructure.
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Due to the availability of rich, high-quality data, employing data mining tools
to solve business problem and related research have gained great popularity in recent
years. Business data typically comes from two sources - online transactions, such as
the bidding history for eBay online auction, and offline transactions, such as sales
transaction data from a grocery product distributor. In this dissertation, we first
develop several forecasting models and bidding strategies for online auction data.
Then we investigate sales representatives’ price formation process, in particular, the
impact of price recommendation on such process, for sales transaction data.
1.1 Introduction to Online Auctions
1.1.1 Online Auctions
Online auction is a significant marketplace, which allows consumers and busi-
nesses to sell, buy, and bid on a variety of goods. People shop for consumer elec-
tronics on uBid (ubid.com), for consumer loans on Prosper.Com, and for almost
everything on eBay (ebay.com). eBay is one of the major online marketplaces and
currently the biggest consumer-to-consumer online auction site. Founded in 1995,
eBay Inc. has attracted over 200 million registered users and touts net revenue
of $8.37 billion for the year 2008 despite the ecomony recession. Dispersed across
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twenty thousands of categories, several millions of items are listed on any given day.
In fact, [6] refers to online auctions as “one of the most successful forms of electronic
commerce”.
Typically in an online auction, the opening price is set by the seller or the
auction house, and bidders submit bids online. There are various auction formats:
Online auctions can be ascending (e.g., in eBay auctions) or descending (e.g., in
Dutch flower auctions where the price is bid down); first price or second price (i.e.
whether the final price is equal to the highest bid or second highest bid); with fixed
or soft closing time (i.e. where the auction duration extends with the arrival of new
bids); for single items or bundles. On eBay, most auctions are second-price ascending
auctions for single items, with a fixed duration. The seller sets the opening price,
and bidders place ascending bids until the auction end time is reached. At that
time, the winner is the highest bidder, and s/he pays the second highest bid (plus
an increment).
Online auctions differ from their offline counterparts in their longer duration
(typically several days), the anonymity of participants, the low barriers of entry,
their global reach, and around-the-clock availability. These conditions lead to a
highly dynamic environment, where bidders engage in competitive behavior that is
motivated by both psychological effects and economic reasoning. Auctions allow
bidders to adjust their behavior based on the previous progress of the auction of
interest and competing auctions, which in turn contributes to the dynamic changes
in auction progression and price.
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1.1.2 eBay Data Structure
Empirical research of online auctions has been flourishing in recent years due to
the important role that these auctions play in the marketplace and the availability
of large amounts of high-quality bid data from eBay (as well as Yahoo!, OnSale,
uBid, etc). eBay makes public a vast amount of rich bidding data that include all
the bidding information as well as information about the bidders, the seller, and the
product being auctioned. A typical example of the bid data for a single auction is
shown in Figure 1.1. From the bid data, we can determine the price as shown on
eBay at any time during the ongoing auction1.
We use two eBay data sets about auction bidding history throughout the
research. One includes the complete bidding records for 380 auctions for new Palm
Pilot M515 handheld PDA’s that took place on eBay between March and May, 2003;
the other data set contains information on 4,965 laptop auctions that took place on
eBay between May and June, 2004. For details about the two data sets, please see
Appendix A.
1.1.3 Online Auction Literature
Statistical and data mining techniques have been extremely instrumental in
gaining insights into auction processes, and we describe some of the major contri-
butions to the online auction literature to date.
One important stream of research has focused on various auction features and
1On eBay, the price shown at any point in time is the second highest bid at that point rather
than the highest bid. Thus, the bid data might include bids that are lower than the highest bid.
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moonwolfdesigns ( 481 ) $157.50 Aug-21-03 10:33:20 PDT
rondaroo1 ( 65 ) $155.00 Aug-21-03 10:32:52 PDT
moonwolfdesigns ( 481 ) $151.99 Aug-21-03 10:19:00 PDT
rondaroo1 ( 65 ) $150.00 Aug-21-03 10:32:23 PDT
rondaroo1 ( 65 ) $145.00 Aug-21-03 10:32:11 PDT
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cpumpkinbatman ( 16 ) $120.95 Aug-21-03 10:02:45 PDT
moonwolfdesigns ( 481 ) $115.95 Aug-21-03 08:31:09 PDT
quest3487 ( 68 ) $110.25 Aug-21-03 07:48:01 PDT
moonwolfdesigns ( 481 ) $108.35 Aug-21-03 08:28:58 PDT
moonwolfdesigns ( 481 ) $102.75 Aug-21-03 07:25:57 PDT
quest3487 ( 68 ) $100.25 Aug-21-03 07:19:48 PDT
moonwolfdesigns ( 481 ) $100.00 Aug-21-03 07:25:43 PDT
moonwolfdesigns ( 481 ) $95.00 Aug-21-03 07:25:30 PDT
moonwolfdesigns ( 481 ) $90.00 Aug-21-03 07:25:11 PDT
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Figure 1.1: Bidding data for an eBay Palm PDA auction.
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their impact on the closing prices. In fact, a seller’s reputation [6], an auction’s
duration [37], opening and reserve prices [74], or an item’s shipping costs [38], all
have been shown to affect the final price (see also [89]). Statistical tools used for
this type of research are mainly classical regression models, and the results from
such analyses help answer sellers’ questions about which auction setting or listing
enhancements are worth the extra fee and improve the design of the online market.
Besides auction features, there has been much interest in understanding the
dynamics of the price formation process recently, in an attempt to better capture,
understand, and forecast price in online auctions. Novel statistical approaches have
been developed in gaining deeper understanding about price dynamics. [52; 10] have
shown that price dynamics can be very heterogeneous, even for auctions of the same
product, using descriptive statistics. [51] have shown this for auction of new Palm
PDA handheld devices sold on eBay; [21] found similar behavior in auctions for
contemporary Indian art. [51] further segmented auctions based on price dynamics:
“steady auctions” are those with constant dynamics, “low-energy auctions” are those
with late dynamics, and “bazaar auctions” see mostly early activity. [86] developed a
three-stage non-homogeneous Poisson process for capturing bid timing, and showed
its flexibility in capturing the bid timing for various items and auction durations,
etc. [97] introduced a single class of functional differential equation models that
captures a wide range of auction price paths and dynamics. Finally, [96] developed
real-time forecasting models for ongoing auctions that use as input the price path
and its dynamics until the time of prediction. They show that the inclusion of the
dynamic information significantly improves predictive accuracy compared to models
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that exclude such information.
Researchers also study the interplay between auction features and dynamics.
[84] illustrated the effect of auction features (such as the opening bid) on auction
dynamics, and found that higher opening bids result in lower price dynamics. [55]
developed model-based regression trees to relate differential equation models for
different auction dynamics to auction features.
Auction dynamics reflect unobservable dynamic behavior such as competition
between bidders within the auction and across auctions. The fact that millions of
auctions are taking place simultaneously and many of these auctions sell the same or
similar items introduces competition both to the sellers and the bidders of the prod-
ucts, which results in competition thus cross-dependencies among auctions and their
outcomes. Consequently, adequately capturing and modeling the price path can be
used for studying the effects of competition. [44] developed visualizations for the
price formation process and its dynamics to study the effect of concurrency among
online auctions. [21] have investigated the relationship between within-auction and
between-auction competition on price dynamics and have shown that price dynamics
are good proxies for the harder-to-measure competition.
Although the presence and importance of competition are broadly noticed by
many scholars, quantified study of its effect is rather limited. This is mainly due to
lack of measures for competition in the dynamic environment. In this dissertation,
we set out to quantify the competition between simultaneous auctions and use such
information in our forecasting of auction outcomes and designing bidding strategies
in this competition environment.
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There exist two very well documented (and researched) bidding strategies for
online auctions, early bidding and last-minute bidding. [8] have shown that early
bidders often discourage potential competitors from entering the same auction by
signaling their commitment early in the auction. In contrast, last-minute bidders
[83; 86] wait until the very last moment to avoid being out-bid. However, neither
strategy takes into account the effect of competition, thus provides no guide for
bidders to select the right auction from many simultaneous auctions to bid on.
We build a forecasting model which accounts for competition among simultaneous
auctions, and develop a bidding strategy around the model that can determine not
only the best auction to bid on but also the right bidding amount.
An alternative way to capture competition is to assign heavier weights to
auctions with high level of competition when estimating the model and making
forecasts. This is in contrast to conventional methods where information from each
auction is weighted equally in the process of model estimation. Examples for con-
ventional methods include [96] which used regression-based models to forecast an
auction’s final price in a dynamic fashion (see also [32; 59]) and [16] which employed
a classification and regression tree method for forecasting. In this dissertation, we
develop a method for computing weights for each auction based on auction similarity
(therefore competition level) and making weighted forecasts.
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1.2 Introduction to Pricing in B2B and B2C and Literature Review
Business transactions are normally divided into four groups: business-to-consumer
(B2C), business-to-business (B2B), business-to-public administration, and consumer-
to-public administration. We only discuss the first two types of transactions here
because the latter two depend heavily on government policies which is basically a
different research area.
A business can ensure profitability and longevity by utilizing appropriate pric-
ing strategy. [69] stated that improved pricing can yield 20%-35% reduction in waste
or unused inventory, 2%-4% increase in corporate revenues, and 1%-3% increase in
profit. However, with the increasing production size and customer population, set-
ting the right price has become an non-trivial task.
Pricing in B2C settings usually involves setting prices for hundreds even thou-
sands of products/services over hundreds of stores nationally and/or internationally
(e.g. retail stores, airlines, and hotels). Such complicated task is typically done by
decision support tool (DST). DST collects vast amounts of data and employ data
mining and optimization routines to uncover the holy grail of pricing - customer’s
willingness-to-pay (WTP) - based on which optimized price is computed. DST has
proven itself to be extremely helpful in enduring profitability in B2C business. For
instance, by the help of DSTs, Marriott’s annual profit increase for individual hotels
totaled $86 million after the rollout of their in-house developed pricing and revenue
management system in 2004 [76].
Customer WTP is often endogenously determined by many factors, some ob-
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servable and some not. The observable traits, such as customer’s purchase history
or price of the same products from competing companies [67], can be captured and
incorporated into DST. The non-observable part, however, cannot be quantified.
Such non-observable factors speak to how a customer perceives/ internalizes a price
quote and reacts to it. For instance, [65] introduce the concepts of fairness, and they
find it is unfair to exploit shifts in demand by raising prices. [64] discuss the notion
of anchoring and how customers make adjustments under uncertain market condi-
tions. [94] study the framing of the price quote, and find that customers respond
differently to price quotes framed different by salesreps. While both observable and
unobservable factors may exist and hence be useful in determining customer WTP
in B2C markets, the relatively small dollar spend of each customer coupled with
the large number of customers present in the market generally imply that DSTs can
make reasonable pricing decisions while ignoring the unobservable traits.
The situation changes as we turn to B2B markets where the characteristics of
each customers matter to pricing. In such settings, sale representatives (hereafter re-
ferred to as “salesreps”) are entrusted with determining the impact of the unobserv-
able customer traits on each customer’s WTP, and managing the (relatively) large
accounts of and relations with several business customers. For example, salesreps
must assess if a customer will find a price to be fair (whether or not it is a price that
is justified by current market conditions), how and on what the customer anchors
his willingness to pay (e.g., the past price paid or possibly a competitor’s current
price), the strength of the relationship between salesrep and customer and hence
whether a customer will trust a quoted price as being reasonable, how customer
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reacts to price increases, etc. To emphasize the human involvement, we hereafter
refer to B2B settings by H2H (Human-to-Human).
With such intangible pieces of information about customers, salesreps are often
considered experts for quoting appropriate prices. However, studies show that being
an “expert” does not always imply better decisions [93]. No matter how experienced
salesreps are, they are all human beings who are subject to their own decision biases
and judgment heuristics (e.g., memory bias, [93], satisficing behavior, [77], status
quo bias, [66]), which leaves space to improve pricing. For instance, salesresps
decision is generally affected by irrelevant information [40], thus providing them
with only most relevant info may lead to appropriate price quotes.
DST, on the other hand, can gather information across hundreds of salesreps,
and is able to make better aggregate predictions about WTP and demand. Hence,
DST price recommendation may provide a valuable reference point on which salesreps
can anchor their price decisions. However, it is not very clear whether price recom-
mendations to salesreps in H2H markets as they have in B2C business.
While there is a large amount of literature on pricing in economics, marketing,
or operations management for B2C markets (e.g. [94; 20; 101]), surprisingly little
research has been done on H2H pricing, and even less so on behavior of salesreps in
this context. With limited understanding of what salesreps anchor on when making
price quotes, it is difficult to improve pricing in B2B setting. We set out to study
how salesreps form prices and respond to price recommendations in H2H markets in
this lack of study. The results will aid designing of DSTs to counter salesrep biases
and improving profitability for companies.
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1.3 Contributions of the Dissertation
Applying statistical tools to help make informed business decisions has at-
tracted enormous amounts of research interest in recent years. Because of the huge
amounts of information available, distinguishing useful from noisy information and
drawing informed conclusions from data becomes a non-trivial task and requires
employment of novel statistical tools. In this dissertation, we develop/apply data
mining techniques to two sources of business data - online auction data and H2H
transaction data. We develop prediction models and bidding strategies in online
auction setting and investigate the impact of DST price recommendation on sales
representatives’ pricing decision. This dissertation has resulted in several papers
under review at Statistics and Business journals; and another paper is coming out
at the end of summer.
1.3.1 Data Driven Bidding Strategy
Bidders participating in online auction often face many complicated bidding
decisions. They have to decide whether to bid early or late, whether to place a single
bid or multiple updates, whether to bid high or low. Bidding is further complicated
by the existence of many auctions that offer the same, or similar item simultaneously.
All in all, a complete bidding strategy has to include decisions on which auction to
bid on and how much.
Many bidders rely on two conventional strategies, early bidding and last-minute
bidding. Although proven to effectively yield a high winning probability for a careful
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selected auction, neither strategy answers bidders’ question about which auction to
bid on given thousands of simultaneous auction.
The first contribution of this dissertation is to propose a novel automated
and data-driven bidding strategy which provides bidders with complete decision
guides. Our strategy consists of two main components. First, we develop a dynamic,
forward-looking forecasting model for price in competing auctions. Then, using the
idea of maximizing consumer surplus, we build a bidding framework around this
model that determines the best auction to bid on and the best bid-amount. We also
conduct a simulation study which shows that our strategy results in a much higher
surplus than two conventional bidding rules. This research, discussed in Chapter 2,
is currently under the second round review at the INFORMS Journal of Computing
[57].
1.3.2 Model Selection for Improved Forecasting
One important component of our bidding strategy is a good forecasting model
for auction closing prices. Knowing the auction’s closing price has several advantages
for auction participants. Bidders can use this information to make more informed
bidding decisions [57]. Sellers can use predictions to identify times when the market
is more favorable to sell their products and to better evaluate the value of their
inventory.
In this chapter, we investigate forecasting alternatives by developing model-
selection strategies for online auctions. Model selection in this setting is different
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compared to classical time series analysis. In classical forecasting, one typically
wants to forecast a particular time point; while in the context of online auction, one
needs to forecast an entire time interval to satisfy bidders’ need of bidding on any
auction that is expected to close in that time window.
Our second contribution of this dissertation is to extend the classical model
selection criteria which are applicable only to a time point to the setting where
forecasting a time interval is required. we do so by computing an entire distribution
of a model selection criterion over the prediction interval. In this Chapter, we
investigate different ways to summarize the distribution and the impact of different
summaries on the prediction task. We find that the models selected by the volatility
of classical AIC or BIC’s distribution over the prediction window have extremely
poor prediction performance, while the models selected by minimum or maximum
predict very well. This research is discussed in Chapter 3 and has been submitted
to the Journal of Business and Economic Statistics for review [58].
1.3.3 Weighted Forecasting of Closing Prices
Besides studying model selection criteria for regression models, we also inves-
tigate forecasting alternatives by developing novel weighted forecasting methods.
For the closing price of an ongoing auction, the natural reference points are the
final prices of past auctions. Previous forecasting methods, including ones devel-
oped in Chapter 2 and 3, put equal weight on the information from all training
auctions when estimating model coefficients and making forecasts. Nevertheless, as-
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suming that more similar auctions contain more relevant information for forecasting,
a forecasting method that weighing the information from each auction differently,
depending on how similar that auction is to the auction of interest, is more ap-
propriate. For this purpose, we apply the popular weighted prediction method -
K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) - for forecasting closing prices of an ongoing auction.
One key aspect to the success of KNN is the choice of distance metric based
on which the distances between samples (i.e. the reciprocal of sample weights) are
measured. This is especially challenging in the context of online auctions because
auctions vary on many conceptually different dimensions, such as static (e.g. auc-
tion starting prices), time-varying (e.g. number of bids) and functional dynamics
information (the dynamics/shapes of the auction price paths). Although there exist
standard measures for static or time-varying information, measuring the distance
between functional dynamic information (e.g., between two curves) is more involved
because of infinite dimensionality.
An important contribution of this research is to point out a new research area
- developing weighted forecasting models for better forecasts. In the study, we in-
troduce a parametric Beta model to capture auction price paths, which allows mea-
suring the distance between auctions’ dynamics in a very parsimonious way via the
Kullback-Leibler distance (KL distance). Furthermore, we define distance metrics
that integrates information of various types, including dynamics. Using the recip-
rocal of the distance as weights, we find that weighing information unequally yields
better forecasts compared to classical methods such as regression models or trees
and this result holds in auctions of varying levels of heterogeneity. This research, dis-
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cussed in Chapter 4, has been recommended for publishing in International Journal
of Forecasting [102].
1.3.4 A Flexible Model for Price Dynamics in Online Auctions
Besides allowing measuring distance between auctions’ dynamics via KL dis-
tance, the Beta model developed in Chapter 4 has many other useful properties in
online auction context. We explore those properties in details and compare it with
existing models for capturing auction price paths.
The fourth contribution of this dissertation is to study the characteristics of
the parsimonious parametric Beta model and show its advantages as a representa-
tion for auction price paths over existing methods. We show that the model can
accurately capture price paths and price dynamics of various types, summarize the
bid timing distribution, measure pairwise distances between price paths or price
dynamics curves, and is computational efficient. This work is discussed in Chapter
5 and currently under review at the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (Series
C) [56].
1.3.5 Decision Making in H2H Transactions
Different from B2C settings where decision support tools (DST) have been
adopted and proven to be extremely valuable in aiding firms and improving their
profits, sales representatives have significant responsibility in pricing decisions in
B2B (H2H) transactions. Salesreps may rely on many observable and non-observable
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information, such as their personal expertise, knowledge of individual customers, and
price recommendations from DST, to make price quotes. Given those many pieces
of related information, especially DST price recommendation, it is not very clear
which are the important factors that take effect in salesreps’ mental model, by which
we refer to their price formation process.
One important contribution of this dissertation is to identify important fac-
tors that determine a salesrep’s mental decision model in a H2H setting. We study
how sales people adjust price quotes for different products and different customers
over time with special attention to the impact of DST price recommendation. We
use various model selection criteria to identify most influential factors, and we find
that salesreps anchor most on cost related information, including cost, sign and size
of cost change, and types of products (perish commodities or non-commodities).
Furthermore, we find that price recommendation from DST, whenever provided, in-
fluence salesreps’ decisions in a positive way. It serves as a price focal point, without
which, salesreps are influenced more by unobservable factors and thus make price
decisions difficult to explain and predict. This work is anticipated to be submitted
to a top business journal (such as Management Science) by the end of summer.
1.3.6 Summary of Dissertation Contributions
To summarize, the contributions of this dissertation are to:
• Propose a novel automated and data-driven bidding strategy which helps bidders
make bidding decision (Chapter 2).
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• Investigate various model selection criteria for forecasting over a time interval in
online auction setting (Chapter 3).
• Propose a K-Nearest Neighbor forecaster for forecasting closing price of online
auctions; introduce a parsimonious model to capture auction price paths that al-
lows measuring distances between auctions’ dynamics; and propose a novel distance
metric for online auctions that takes into account both static and time-varying fea-
tures as well as the auction’s price dynamics information (Chapter 4).
• Study characteristics of the beta model and illustrate its advantages over existing
models as representations of auction price paths (Chapter 5).
• Identify the key factors influence saleresps’ pricing decisions and investigate the
impact of decision support tool on salesreps (Chapter 6).
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Chapter 2
An Automated and Data-Driven Bidding Strategy for Online
Auctions
2.1 Introduction
The flexibility of time and location as well as the availability of many different
products make online auctions an important marketplace. However, bidders partic-
ipating in this marketplace often face many complicated bidding decisions. They
have to decide whether to bid early or late, whether to place a single bid or multiple
updates, whether to bid high or low. Bidding is further complicated by the existence
of many auctions that offer the same, or similar item simultaneously. In that case,
one’s bidding strategy has to be expanded to include decisions on which auction to
bid on, when to bid on that auction, and how much.
There exist two very well documented bidding strategies, early bidding and
last-minute bidding. By signaling their commitment early, early bidders [8] discour-
age competitors from entering the same auction. In contrast, last-minute bidders
[83; 86] wait until the very last moment as the chances of being out-bid decrease with
the time left in the auction. However, both bidding strategies suffer from limitations
since neither takes into account the effect of competition [39]. In other words, nei-
ther strategy considers the information from simultaneous auctions offering similar
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products. While there is emerging literature [100] that suggests that bidders should
shade their bids in the presence of sequential auctions, the precise amount of the
optimal shade on an auction-by-auction basis is not quite clear.
In this chapter, we propose a novel automated and data-driven bidding strat-
egy. Our strategy consists of two main components. First, we develop a dynamic,
forward-looking forecasting model for price in competing auctions. Then, using
the idea of maximizing consumer surplus, we build a bidding framework around
this model that determines several decisions: the best auction to bid on and the
best bid-amount. This work is currently under the second round review at Informs
Journal of Computing.
The first component of our automated bidding strategy is a dynamic forecast-
ing model for the price in competing auctions. There has been considerable amount
of work on predicting an auction’s closing price using static (or pre-auction) infor-
mation (see e.g. [6; 37; 38; 74]). One drawback to these approaches is that they
only consider information available before the start of the auction and thus ignore
the dynamic nature of the auction process.
Dynamics have only recently been found to affect the outcome of an online
auction [10]. [51] find that auctions selling identical products fall into one of three
segments of price dynamics, namely “steady auctions” which experience a constant
flow of dynamics, “low-energy auctions” with late dynamics and “bazaar auctions”
which see the largest jump of dynamics. [84] illustrate the effect of auction parame-
ters (such as the opening bid) on an auction’s dynamics and find that higher opening
bids result in lower price dynamics. [97] show that an auction’s price dynamics can
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be characterized well using a single class of functional differential equation models
and [55] extend upon this idea and develop model based regression trees to relate
differential equation models to auction covariates. Moreover, [96] show that the
inclusion of price dynamics into forecasting models significantly improves the pre-
dictive capability of an auction (see also [7]). In this study, we build upon the ideas
developed in previous studies. However, one key difference is that, in contrast to
previous studies, we study dynamics in the context of competing auctions. That
is, we study the effect of dynamics generated in simultaneous auctions, selling the
same or similar product as the auction of interest. We incorporate the dynamic
nature of the auction process by employing a modern statistical approach called
functional data analysis (FDA). See [79] for a general introduction to FDA or [52]
for an illustration of FDA in the context of electronic commerce.
Besides incorporating dynamics, our model also explicitly accounts for the
information from competing auctions. Competition between auctions has come to
the spotlight only recently (e.g. [39; 37; 3; 17]). One problem with competition
is the precise quantification of its effect. [53] propose a spatio-temporal model
to measure similarity among concurrent auctions. [44] take a functional approach
to visualize concurrent auctions and their dynamics. (See also [50] for additional
visualizations of concurrent auctions.) In this chapter, we propose several innovative
measures for auction competition using the concept of functional data analysis. Our
measures can be grouped into three conceptually different classes: measures that
capture competition from static (or pre-auction) information; from time-varying
information; and from dynamics. We perform variable selection to identify the most
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predictive set of competition measures.
Our proposed forecasting model incorporates measures of dynamics and com-
petition as predictors. In contrast to [96], our model also takes into account compe-
tition; in contrast to [53], we measure competition in ways that are easily scalable
and do not rely on spatial methodology. We compare our model’s predictive ca-
pability to several alternate approaches, and find that our model can predict an
auction’s price with higher accuracy.
In the second component, we build a comprehensive bidding strategy around
our forecasting model. The idea is based on maximizing consumer surplus, which
refers to the difference between the bidders’ willingness to pay (WTP) and the price
actually paid. We formulate an automated algorithm for selecting the best auction to
bid on, and for determining the best bid-amount. The best auction provides bidders
with the highest surplus, and the best bid-amount equals the predicted closing price.
We conduct a simulation study where we compare our automated, data-driven
bidding strategy with early bidding and last-minute bidding. We compare all bidding
strategies on two different dimensions: the probability of winning an auction, and
the surplus extracted. We find that although snipers have the highest probability
of winning, our strategy results in a much higher surplus. We also investigate the
impact of the prediction window on the resulting surplus. The prediction window is
equivalent to the given time frame within which a bidders wants to win an auction.
Shorter time frames correspond to bidders that want to win more quickly; longer
time frames correspond to bidders that allow more time for search and selection.
We find that, as the width of the prediction window is increasing, surplus goes up
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while the probability of winning goes down.
The chapter unfolds as follows: In Section 2.2, we describe the data; in Section
2.3, we derive our forecasting model. Results of model estimation are discussed in
Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we present the framework for our automated bidding
strategy and the results of our simulation study. We conclude with further research
directions in Section 2.6.
2.2 Data Description
The data used in this study are the complete bidding records for new Palm
M515 handheld devices, auctioned between March 14, 2003 and May 25, 2003. The
market price at the time of data collecting was $230 (based on Amazon.com). Each
bidding record includes the auction number, starting- and closing-time and -prices,
bids with associated time stamps, and other information, such as auction duration,
shipping fee, seller’s feedback score, whether the seller is a power seller, whether the
product is from an eBay store, and whether auction’s description includes pictures.
A summary of this information can be found in Table A.1.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the information-overload that bidders face. In particular,
we see, for each individual auction, the live price curve, that is, the price that bidders
see at any given time during the ongoing auction. We can see that the information
can be quite overwhelming: the amount of concurrent auctions, the variation in
prices and the fact that some auctions are only in the early stages, while others
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Figure 2.1: Snapshot of the live price curves during eBay auctions.
Moreover, we see that prices increase unevenly throughout most auctions. They
increase fast in some auctions, but much slower in others. We refer to this as price
dynamics, which will be an important factor in our modeling approach.
2.3 A Model for Forecasting Competing Auctions
Our forecasting model has several features: We model the real-time price
process of ongoing auctions using functional data analysis (FDA), which allows us
to incorporate information about the dynamics of price. We also propose several
innovative ways of incorporating competition across concurrent auctions, and then
we suggest an innovative way to perform model selection1 and model updating. We
describe these features in detail next.
1A more complete study about the model selection can be found in next chapter.
23
2.3.1 Functional Data Analysis and Price Dynamics
The price process of online auctions is characterized by an extremely dynamic
environment. One aspect of this environment is the changing bid density, where
the number of bids per time unit changes constantly. The resulting unequally-
spaced time-series of bids deem traditional models (which assume evenly spaced
measurements) inadequate. Furthermore, the changing bidding patterns also result
in varying price dynamics. By price dynamics we mean the change in price and
the rate at which this change occurs. Traditional forecasting models, which do
not account for such instantaneous change, fail to accurately predict auction prices
[96]. To incorporate this dynamic environment, we take a functional data modeling
approach.
Functional data analysis [79] uses smoothing methods2 to recover (or estimate)
the underlying price curve from observed bidding data. From the price curve, we
then obtain estimates of the price dynamics via its first and second derivatives.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the process of generating smooth price curves from observed
data (left panel) and estimating the corresponding price velocities (right panel). We
see that the smooth curves capture the trend of the price increase due to the discrete
bids; the velocity captures the instant change of price increase. For more details on
FDA in the context of online auctions, refer to [84] or [52]; and for more details on
the smoothing process, see Section 5.2.1 in Chapter 5.
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Figure 2.2: Smooth price curves (left panel) and corresponding velocities (right
panel) for two sample auctions. The dots in the left panel denote the observed bids.
2.3.2 Capturing Competition
One major component of our model is competition. That is, we want to
capture the effect of what happens in other, simultaneous auctions. To that end,
we must first define meaningful measures for competition. There are many different
ways of defining competition measures and we explore several alternatives below.
All measures are driven by the same general principle which is illustrated in Figure
2.3. We define a focal auction (indicated by the solid line in Figure 2.3) as the
auction for which a bidder wants to decide whether or not to bid on. At time T
of decision-making, there are several other auctions that take place simultaneously
(indicated by the dotted lines). One meaningful measure of competition is the level
of price in other auctions. In our example, there are four different prices levels at
time T , varying from high (p1) to low (p4). The price level in the focal auction at
that time is p3. Thus, a possible measure for the price competition is given by the
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average price in concurrent auctions (which we denote by c.avg.price), that is, by
the average of p1, p2 and p4. In similar fashion, the average price velocity (c.avg.vel)
in concurrent auctions would be defined as the average of the corresponding price






















Figure 2.3: Illustrating competition: The sold black line denotes the focal auction;
the dashed lines denote competing auctions; T denotes the time of decision-making.
In this chapter, we investigate several different competition features and their
impact on the price of the focal auction. Table 2.1 categorizes these features by the
information that they carry: Static competition features are known at the outset
of the auction and do not change during the auction process; examples include
the opening price of concurrent auctions (a high opening price in other auctions
could discourage bidders and make them participate in the focal auction) or the
duration of concurrent auctions (if competing auctions have a shorter duration,
then bidders with an immediate desire may be attracted to those auctions); Time-
varying competition features change during the auction process, such as the current
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price of concurrent auctions (if the price is low in other auctions, bidders may leave
the focal auction) or the number of bidders of concurrent auctions (bidders may
feel that their chances of winning are higher in auctions with lower competition);
and price dynamic competition features capture the effect of changing dynamics in
competing auctions (if the price dynamics increase in competing auctions, e.g., due
increased bidding activity in those auctions, then the price speed in the focal auction
is likely to slow down).
In Figure 2.4, we explore the relationships between some of the competition
features from Table 2.1 and the future price in the focal auction. We can see that
some features (e.g., the average price and its velocity in competing auctions) have
a strong relationship with price, while others (e.g., the average opening bids or the
shipping fee in simultaneous auctions) have a rather weak relationship. Pairwise
correlation analysis (not reproduced here) also shows that, unsurprisingly, many of
the features in Table 2.1 are multicollinear. Thus, a good modeling strategy will
start with a suitable variable selection procedure. We will use the initial observations
from Figure 2.4 for guidance when selecting the most relevant set of competition
features in the next section.
2.3.3 Variable Selection
Many different pieces of information can affect price in online auctions. We
differentiate between two main components, information from within the focal auc-
tion vs. information from other, competing auctions that take place simultaneously.
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Table 2.1: Candidate Competition Features
Name Description
Static Features
c.openbid.avg Average opening price of concurrent auctions
c.dura.avg Average duration of concurrent auctions
c.ship.avg Average shipping fee of concurrent auctions
c.feedback.avg Average sellers’ feedback of concurrent auctions
c.power.avg Average number of power seller in concurrent auctions
c.store.avg Average number of eBay stores in concurrent auctions
c.pic.avg Average number of pictures in concurrent auctions
Time-varying Features
c.price.avg Current average price in concurrent auctions
c.price.vol Current price volatility (stdev) in concurrent auctions
c.price.disc Price discount (difference) between focal auction and
highest concurrent price
c.t.left.avg Average time left in concurrent auctions
c.t.left.vol Volatility (stdev) of time left in concurrent auctions
c.nbids.avg Average number of bids in concurrent auctions
c.nbids.vol Volatility (stdev) of number of bids in concurrent auctions
c.nbidders.avg Average number of bidders common to focal and concurrent auctions
c.nbidders.vol Volatility (stdev) of number of bidders common to focal
and concurrent auctions
Price dynamic Features
c.vel.avg Average price velocity in concurrent auctions
c.vel.vol Volatility (stdev) of price velocity in concurrent auctions
c.acc.avg Average price acceleration in concurrent auctions
c.acc.vol Volatility (stdev) of price acceleration in concurrent auctions
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Figure 2.4: Pairwise relationships between some of the competition features from
Table 2.1 (measured at time T ) and the price (measured at T + 1) in the focal
auction.
Within each component, information can be further segmented into static, time-
varying and price dynamic information, similar to Table 2.1. Table 2.2 lists all the
different pieces of information that are candidates for our forecasting model.
Table 2.2 shows that there are over 30 different variables that are candidates
for our forecasting model. Thus, an important first step in our modeling efforts is the
selection of a parsimonious subset of relevant predictors. Variable selection has been
researched in the statistics literature for a while [13] and it is receiving increasing
attention today with the availability of more and more data sets featuring larger
and larger number of variables [30]. A complicating factor in our situation is the
time-varying nature of our model. Our goal is to find a model that predicts well at
time T +1, universally across all time periods T = 1, 2, 3, . . . , NT . Classical variable
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selection procedures focus on cross-sectional data, that is, on data corresponding to
a single time period only. Since our data varies over time, it is quite plausible that
there exists one model that best predicts at time T + 1, while another (different)
model best predicts at a different time T ′ + 1. Our goal is to find a model that is
not geared to a single time period only, but applies rather universally to the eBay
market over a longer time window. To that end, we choose a model which has good
average performance3, averaged over all time periods T of interest. We describe this
approach next.
Table 2.2: Candidate information for the forecasting model
Information from within the focal auction
Static information opening bid, auction duration, shipping fee,
seller’s feedback, power seller, eBay store,
picture
Time-varying information current price, time left, current number of
bids, current number of bidders
Price dynamic information price velocity, price acceleration
Information from competing auctions
Static information c.openbid.avg, c.dura.avg, c.ship.avg,
c.feedback.avg, c.power.avg, c.store.avg, c.pic.avg
Time-varying information c.price.avg, c.price.vol, c.price.disc, c.t.left.avg,
c.t.left.vol, c.nbids.avg, c.nbids.vol, c.nbidders.avg,
c.nbidders.vol
Price dynamic information c.vel.avg, c.vel.vol, c.acc.avg, c.acc.vol
3Note that our decision to use the criterion that has the best “average” performance is rather
intuitive. We conduct a more complete study on different criteria in the next chapter.
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where yT+1 denotes the auction prices at T + 1, xT = (xT1, . . . , xTp)
′ is a vector
of predictors, and βT = (βT1, . . . , βTp)
′ is a vector of coefficients to be estimated
from the data. The goal is to select only those predictors that are important for
predicting the price yT+1, across all time periods T = 1, 2, 3, . . . , NT .
We accomplish this in several steps. In the first step, we run simple regressions
(i.e. p = 1) between each individual predictor from Table 2.2 and the response yT+1
at each time period T, T = 1, 2, 3, . . . , NT . We then calculate the percentage of
time points a predictor is significant (at the 5% significance level). That is, for each
predictor xk = (x1k, . . . , xNT k)






1{xTk significant at 5% level}. (2.2)
Table 2.3 shows the results for a fine grid of hourly forecasts (i.e. (T +1)−T =
1 hour) which results in NT = 1, 754 different time periods. We can see that the pre-
dictors that individually have a strong effect on yT+1 (consistently across all time pe-
riods T ) are the current price, price velocity and acceleration, time left and the num-
ber of bids (from within the focal auctions) and c.price.avg, c.price.vol, c.price.disc,
c.t.left.avg, c.t.left.vol, c.nbids.avg, c.nbids.vol, c.vel.avg, c.vel.vol, c.acc.avg and
4While we use an un-weighted average, a possible alternative would be to weight each time
point according to its distance from the close of the auction.
31
Table 2.3: Percentage of significant time points. The two leftmost columns refer
to predictors from within the focal auction; the two rightmost columns refer to
predictors from competing auctions.
Focal auction p.sig Competing auctions p.sig
openbid .199 c.openbid.avg .193
duration .032 c.dura.avg .032
shipping .039 c.ship.avg .046
sellerfeed .055 c.feedback.avg .044
powerseller .061 c.power.avg .076
store .092 c.store.avg .104
picture .028 c.pic.avg .028
currenprice 1.00 c.price.avg 1.00
c.price.vol .886
c.price.disc 1.00
timeleft .775 c.t.left.avg .771
c.t.left.vol .758
numbids .780 c.nbids.avg .777
c.nbids.vol .509
numbidders .197 c.nbidders.avg .188
c.nbidders.vol .086
price velocity .762 c.vel.avg .762
c.vel.vol .624
price acceleration .308 c.acc.avg .309
c.acc.vol .306
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c.acc.vol (from competing auctions). It is interesting that most of these variables
relate to price (or price movement) from the focal auction relative to competing
auctions. This suggests that information about price and its dynamics effectively
captures much of the relevant auction information such as information about the
product, the auction format, the seller and competition between bidders. However,
also note that the results so far are based only on simple regressions (p = 1) and thus
may not fully reflect the joint effect of a predictor in the presence of other predictor
variables. To that end, we investigate pairwise correlations (again, averaged across
all time periods, T = 1, . . . , NT ; correlation-table not reported here) and find high
collinearity between ten pairs: the current price and c.price.avg, the current price
and c.price.vol, the current price and c.price.disc, the current price and time left,
the current price and c.t.left.avg, the current price and number of bids, the current
price and c.nbids.avg, price velocity and c.vel.avg, price velocity and c.vel.vol, and
price acceleration and c.acc.avg. This high collinearity is not surprising since many
of these predictors carry similar information, only coded in a slightly different way.
We eliminate all highly collinear predictors; next we derive our final model using
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
In similar fashion to equ.(2.2), one can compute the average BIC across all time
periods. That is, let avg.BIC := meanT (BIC(T )), where BIC(T ), T = 1, 2, 3, . . . , NT ,
denotes the Bayesian Information Criterion (e.g. [30]) of a model computed at time
period T 5. By comparing all possible subsets of non-collinear predictors, we arrive
5Note that we calculate the average of BIC across only the time points where BIC is applicable.
That is, time points where BIC is not available due to non-sufficient data for modeling is ignored
in this definition.
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at our final forecasting model as
yT+1 = αT + β1T current priceT + β2T velocityT + β3T accelerationT − β4T c.acc.volT .
(2.3)
Table 2.4 shows the avg.BIC of our final forecasting model (2.3) compared to
several competitor models. We can see that our model results in the lowest avg.BIC.
It is also interesting to see that models with only information from competing auc-
tions perform almost as well as models with the corresponding information only
from within the focal auction. This is yet another piece of evidence for the tight
connectivity of the auction marketplace.
Table 2.4: Average BIC computed across all time periods T . The first row shows the
value of avg.BIC for our model in (2.3); the remaining rows show the corresponding
values of several competing models.
Model avg.BIC
Our model from eq. (2.3) -381.59
Full model (all 33 predictors from Table 2.2) -147.08
All 13 predictors from the focal auction (Table 2.2) -319.82
Only 2 focal auction dynamics 37.77
Only 4 focal auction time-varying predictors -83.87
All 20 predictors from competing auctions (Table 2.2) -313.52
Only 4 competing auction dynamics 37.58
Only 9 competing auction time-varying predictors -84.29
A few comments about our final model in (2.3) are in order. It is interesting
to see that the model relies only price related information. In particular, it is
interesting to see that many variables that have been found significant in previous
studies have dropped out of our model. For instance, [74] find, among other things,
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a significant effect of the seller’s rating. One key difference between previous studies
and our study is that while they take a static look at online auctions, our model
captures the dynamic nature of the auction process. In other words, previous studies
typically only look at the static, pre-auction information that is available before the
start of the auction (such as the auction length, the opening bid or a seller’s rating).
In such a static view, the effect of the seller’s rating is highly significant (since the
seller’s reputation and trustworthiness will impact the final price). However, our
model is dynamic in the sense that all previous price considerations and bidding
decisions have already been factored into the current price and its current dynamics
(current priceT , velocityT , accelerationT ). In that sense, price dynamics reflect the
expectations of all bidders about the product, the seller and the bidding competition
up to this time point. It is thus not too surprising that all static variables drop from
our final model. The effect that captures concurrency is more intriguing. Note
that the information from concurrent auctions is captured in a single variable, the
volatility of dynamics from competing auctions (c.acc.volT ). As there has not been
much prior research on the effect of concurrent auctions, it is hard to formulate
an expectation about c.acc.volT . However, the negative sign indicates that higher
variance in the price movements of competing auctions will result in smaller price
advances of the focal auction. In other words, more price activity in different parts
of the market will lead to price stalling of the focal auction. We will conduct a more
complete study regarding the model selection in Chapter 3.
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2.3.4 Model Updating
The goal of our model is to predict price at a future time T + 1 using only
information from the present (i.e. time T ) and the past (T − 1, T − 2, etc.). We
accomplish this by estimating the functional relationship between T − 1 and T and

















Figure 2.5: The illustration of the update scheme in the forecasting model
At time T (present), we wish to make a prediction about the future price at
time T + 1. Per our model, yT+1 is given by β
′
TxT , where xT contains information
observed in the present (or past). Note that we cannot estimate βT directly since
the response (yT+1) is yet unobserved. We therefore estimate the relationship from
the past: We estimate βT−1 for the price at T (yT ) and then estimate βT via β̂T :=
βT−1. In that sense, we “roll” the relationship from the past one time period forward.
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We also investigated alternate updating approaches (such as estimating βT via a
moving average (MA) of prior relationships, β̂T := MA{βT−1, βT−2, βT−3, . . . }) but
did not find significant improvements in model performance.
2.4 Estimation and Prediction Results
In this section we discuss estimation and prediction of our forecasting model in
(2.3). We also compare its predictive capabilities to alternate forecasting approaches.
To that end, we divide our data set into a training set (80% of the data),
and a validation set (remaining 20% of the data). Since our data varies over time
(and since we are primarily interested in making accurate predictions of the future),
our training set consists of all auctions that complete during the first 80% of our
data’s time span (i.e. between March 14 and May 10); the validation set contains
all remaining auctions (i.e. between May 11 and May 25). In that sense, we first
estimate our model on the training set; results of model estimation and -fit are
discussed below. We then apply the estimated model to the validation set to gauge
its predictive capabilities; this is discussed in the second half of this section.
2.4.1 Model Estimation
Figure 2.6 shows the estimated coefficients for the parameters of our forecast-
ing model (2.3). Recall that we estimate the model at every time point T, T =
1, 2, 3, . . . , NT in the training set. In our application, we consider time intervals
of one hour over the time period between March 14 and May 10, hence the coeffi-
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cients also vary over that time period. Figure 2.6 shows the resulting trend of the






































































Figure 2.6: Estimated coefficients of model parameters, together with 95% confi-
dence bounds. The x-axis denotes calendar time; the y-axis denotes the magnitude
of the coefficient. The panels show (from top left to bottom right) current price,
price velocity, price acceleration and the acceleration volatility of competing auctions
(c.acc.vol).
We can see that information from within the focal auction (current price, price
velocity and acceleration) has a positive relationship with the future price yT+1; in
contrast, information from competing auctions (c.acc.vol) has a negative relation-
ship. In other words, both the current level of price and its dynamics are positive
indicators of future price. On the other hand, the volatility of price acceleration
in competing auctions is a negative indicator. Price acceleration in competing auc-
tions will be high if many bidders bid in auctions different from the focal auction.
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A high volatility in price acceleration may suggest high uncertainty in the market-
place, with some auctions experiencing large price jumps and others experiencing
no price movements at all. This high uncertainty results in depressed prices of the
focal auction.
2.4.2 Model Fit and Varying Time Intervals
Figure 2.6 shows the estimated model coefficients for one hour time intervals;
that is, for (T + 1) − T = 1 hour. Alternatively, one could also consider models
with a larger time intervals; that is, models that forecast further into the future.
Intuitively, since forecasting further into the future is harder, such models should
not perform as well. Figure 2.7 (left panel) shows the model fit for the time intervals
(T + 1)− T = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 14 hours. We measure model fit by the average R2 value,
avg.R2 := (1/NT )
∑
T R
2(T ), where R2(T ), T = 1, 2, 3, . . . , NT , denotes the R
2 of
a model computed at time period T . We can see that, as expected, the model fit
decreases as the time intervals get larger. Notice though that even for the largest
time interval (14 hours), the value of avg.R2 is still larger than 99%.
2.4.3 Prediction Performance
As pointed out above, we estimate the model on the training set; then we gauge
its predictive performance on the validation set. We measure predictive performance
of a model in terms of its mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). For each time
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Figure 2.7: Model fit and prediction accuracy for different time intervals. The x
axis represents the time interval (in hours; ranging from 1 hr to 14 hrs); the y axis
represents the value of avg.R2 (left panel) and the value of avg.MAPE (right panel).








where yT+1,i and ŷT+1,i denote the true and predicted values of auction i at time
T + 1, respectively, and mT+1 denotes the number of auctions available at time
T + 1. We compute the average MAPE across all time periods as avg.MAPE :=
(1/NT )
∑
T MAPE(T ). In similar fashion to Section 2.4.2, we investigate avg.MAPE
for different time intervals, (T + 1) − T = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 14 hours. The right panel in
Figure 2.7 shows the results.
Unsurprisingly, we see that as we predict further into the future (i.e. as time in-
terval gets larger), the predictive performance decreases (i.e. avg.MAPE increases).
It is interesting to see that for predictions up to 4 hours into the future, the predic-
tion error is less than 0.1%. For time intervals larger than 4 hours, the prediction
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error increases at a faster rate. However, even for predictions as far as 14 hours
into the future, the error is still less than 1%. This predictive accuracy is quite
remarkable as we will see in the next subsection where we benchmark our approach
against several competing approaches. We also want to note that while we can-
not claim generalizability to all eBay auctions, there has been prior evidence that
real-time forecasting models can provide superior predictive accuracy, especially for
books and electronics (see [96]).
2.4.4 Comparison with Alternative Models
We benchmark our model against five alternative models, the generalized ad-
ditive model (GAM), classification and regression trees (CART), Neural Networks
and two simper linear models: a purely static and an time-varying linear model.
























Figure 2.8: Prediction accuracy for competing models. The x axis represents the
time interval (in hours); the y axis represents the value of avg.MAPE.
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GAMs relax the restrictive linear model assumption between the response and
predictors by a more flexible nonparametric form [41]. CARTs [15] provide a data-
driven way to partition the variable-space and are thus often viewed as alternatives
to formal variable selection. Neural Networks also provide a technique that can
approximate non-linear functional relationships. In addition, we consider two linear
models that use a subset of the variables from Table 2.2: one model that uses
only static information from the focal auction and another one that uses static
and time-varying information from the focal auction; we refer to these two models
as “STATIC” and “TIME-VARYING,” respectively. The static model corresponds
to the information of many prior eBay studies (e.g.[74]) in that it only considers
pre-auction information. The time-varying model accounts for changes due to the
process of bidding, but it does not account for price dynamics or competition.
Figure 2.8 shows avg.MAPE (similar to Figure 2.7) for time intervals (T +
1) − T = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 14 hours, for all 6 different models. We refer to our model
(2.3) as “DYN&COMP,” since it incudes dynamics and competition features. We
can see that STATIC and CART have the worst prediction performance, with an
error uniformly larger than 10%. While our model performs the best, GAM, TIME-
VARYING and Neural Nets are competitive, at least for smaller time intervals. In
other words, for predicting less than 4 hours into the future, both GAM and TIME-
VARYING pose alternatives with prediction errors not too much larger compared to
DYN&COMP. However, their predictive performance breaks down for larger time
intervals. In fact, the error of GAM is as large as 10% for predicting 14 hours
into the future, which is 10 times larger than the corresponding prediction error
42
of DYN&COMP. While the performance of TIME-VARYING is somewhat better,
its prediction error is 4 time as large as DYN&COMP for 14 hours time intervals
(similar for the Neural Network). In the next section, we use the excellent forecasting
performance of our model and build an automated bidding strategy around it.
2.5 An Automated Data-Driven Bidding Decision Rule
We now discuss the second component of our bidding strategy, building an
automated and data-driven decision rule around our forecasting model. The decision
rule provides answers to three basic bidding questions: which auction to bid on, when
to bid on it and how much.
2.5.1 Decision Framework
Our decision framework is built upon the principles of maximizing consumer
surplus (e.g.[11]). Consumer surplus is the difference between the actual price paid
and the consumer’s willingness to pay for an item, CS = WTP - Price, where CS
denotes consumer surplus, and WTP denotes willingness to pay. Therefore, the
lower the price, the higher is a bidder’s surplus.
For each individual auction, our forecasting model (2.3) provides bidders with
that auction’s estimated future price; combining this with a bidder’s WTP leads to
an auction’s estimated surplus. For a set of competing auctions, a plausible decision
rule is to bid on that auction with the highest estimated surplus. Moreover, in order
to avoid a negative surplus, a bidder should only bid on an auction if the predicted
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price is lower than his WTP.
Note that our forecasting model depends on the length of the time interval
(T + 1)− T (which we also refer to as the prediction window). Our model can only
predict the final price of an auction that ends at or before time (T + 1). Therefore,
longer prediction windows will result in a larger number of candidate auctions, that
is, in a larger supply of potential auctions to bid on. On the other hand, we have
also seen in Section 2.4.3 that a larger time interval leads to an increased prediction
error. Therefore, our decision rule faces a trade-off between supply of candidate
auctions and prediction accuracy for each individual auction. We will investigate
this trade-off in detail below.
Our decision rule picks that auction with the highest estimated surplus, as
long as the surplus is positive. After picking an auction, the next two questions are
with respect to the time and amount of the bid. Since our forecasting model is based
on a fixed time interval, nothing is gained by waiting. So we suggest placing the
bid as soon as an auction is picked. Moreover, since our model predicts an auction’s
closing price at ŷT+1, we would expect to lose for bids lower than ŷT+1. Similarly,
bids higher than ŷT+1 are expected to overpay. Therefore, we suggest to bid exactly
the expected (or predicted) closing price ŷT+1. In summary, our decision rule picks
the auction with the highest predicted surplus, it bids the predicted price, and it
places the bid immediately.
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2.5.2 Experimental Set-Up
We conduct a simulation study to compare our automated bidding strategy to
two alternate (and popular) bidding approaches: early bidding [8] and last-minute
bidding [83]. Early bidding is often viewed as a bidder’s strong commitment and
intends to deter others from entering the auction. Last-minute bidding is popular
because it does not allow much time for other bidders to react. In our simulation,
we assume that a bidder’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) is drawn from a uniform distri-
bution [2] distributed symmetrically around the market value ($230 at the time of
data-collection). That is, we assume WTP ∼ Uniform($220, $240). Our experiment
then proceeds as follows. We randomly draw a WTP from that distribution. We
also draw an auction from the validation set (i.e. we compare the bidding strategies
on the same real-world data that we compare the forecasting models). The bidder
then makes a bidding decision (whether or not to bid, and how much to bid) with
each of the three bidding strategies outlined below. We repeat this experiment for
all auctions in the validation set and for 20 different random draws from a bidder’s
WTP distribution.
2.5.2.1 Early Bidding Strategy
We assume that early bidders bid at the end of the first auction day [8]. In
fact, we find that slightly earlier or later bid times barely affect the outcome of the
experiment. The process of early bidding is illustrated in the left panel of Figure











Figure 2.9: Illustration of bidding strategies. The left panel illustrates early and
last-minute bidding; the right panel illustrates our automated bidding strategy.
the first day (pearly); if his WTP is higher, then he places a bid; otherwise, he does
not place a bid and moves on to another auction. If he does place a bid, then the
bid amount equals the WTP. Note though that due to eBay’s proxy bidding system
which incrementally bids up to the WTP on behalf of the bidder, the final price may
be lower than the WTP. As a consequence, the bidder only pays the amount of the
second-highest bid plus a pre-specified bid-increment (which ranges between $2.5
and $5 in our case). We also investigate alternate bidding heuristics in Appendix
B. However, none of these heuristics beat last-minute bidding or our automated
bidding strategy.
2.5.2.2 Last-Minute Bidding Strategy
We assume that last-minute bidders place their bid one minute before the auc-
tion closes [83]. Last-minute bidding carries the danger that the bid does not go
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through due to network congestion, but we will not explicitly consider this disad-
vantage in our simulations. The process of last-minute bidding is again illustrated
in the left panel of Figure 2.9. A bidder compares his WTP with the auction’s
current price one minute before closing (plate). Similar to early bidding, if his WTP
is higher, then he places a bid; otherwise, he does not place a bid and moves on to
another auction. If he does place a bid, then the bid-amount is only incrementally
higher than the current price, since the chances of being outbid within the last 60
seconds are small. In our simulations, we bid an increment of 2% over the current
price plate. We also study the robustness to different increments in Appendix B and
find that bid-increments of 1%, 2% or $2 yield comparable results.
2.5.2.3 Our Automated Data-Driven Bidding Strategy
Our automated bidding strategy is conceptually different from early and last-
minute bidding. Instead of making a bidding decision for each auction individually,
our strategy requires a bidding decision for each time interval. Consider the right
panel of Figure 2.9. At time T of decision making, there are four competing auctions,
denoted by Auc1-Auc4, which all close before time T +1. The solid lines correspond
to the observed part of the auction history; the dotted lines denote the future
(and yet unobserved) price path. Since all auctions close before T + 1, our model
yields predictions of their final prices (denoted by the solid black circles). Note
that Auc4 has the highest predicted price; moreover, its predicted price is higher
than the bidder’s WTP; hence the bidder will never consider this auction. Auc3
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has the smallest predicted price; since the predicted price is also smaller than the
bidder’s WTP, he places a bid on this auction. He bids the predicted price and he
bids immediately, i.e. at time T . If he wins, then the bidder’s surplus will be the
difference between his WTP and the actual closing price.
2.5.3 Simulation Results
Similar to [8], we compare all bidding strategies on two dimensions: the prob-
ability of winning the auction and the average surplus accrued. We compute the
probability of winning (p.win) as the number of auctions won divided by the total
number of auctions that the bidder placed a bid on. We compute the average surplus
(avg.sur) as the corresponding difference between the WTP and actual price paid
for an auctions. The results are shown in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Comparison of different bidding strategies. The first row corresponds
to last-minute bidding; the second row corresponds to early bidding; and the last
row corresponds to out automated bidding strategy. We report the mean estimates
(with standard errors in parentheses).
p.win avg.sur
Last-moment bidding 95% (.5%) $17.97 ($0.35)
Early bidding 53% (2%) $18.85 ($0.57)
Automated bidding 61% (1%) $32.33 ($1.95)
We see that last-minute bidders have the highest probability of winning (95%,
compared to 61% for our automated bidding strategy). This is not surprising, since
last-minute bidding is geared to out-witting the competition in the last moment.
However, we also see that last-minute bidding accrue a significantly lower surplus
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compared to our automated bidding strategy ($18 vs. $32). Another way of com-
paring the two bidding strategies is via their expected surplus, i.e. the product
(p.win × avg.sur). We find that last-minute bidding yields an expected surplus of
$17.11 6 while that of our automated bidding strategy is higher: $19.72. Moreover
while early bidders have a probability of 53% of winning the auction, their expected
surplus is significantly lower: $9.99 (=53% × $18.85).
2.5.3.1 Effect of the Prediction Window
We have pointed out earlier that the length of the prediction window (i.e.
the length of the time interval (T + 1) − T ) has an effect on the outcome of our
automated bidding strategy in that longer windows result in a larger supply of
candidate auctions, but at the same time reduce the prediction accuracy of each
individual auction. The results from the previous section (Table 2.5) are based
on a prediction window of 12 hours and we have seen that it yields an expected
surplus of $19.72 for our automated bidding strategy. Longer prediction windows
yield a larger number of candidate auctions and as such a larger probability of
including an auction with a lower price (and hence a higher surplus). On the other
hand, longer prediction windows also lead to less accurate predictions. Less accurate
predictions can either lead to overpayment (if the predicted price, and hence our
bid, are higher than the actual price); overpayment leads to a lower surplus. Less
accurate predictions can also lead to a reduced probability of winning the auction
(if the predicted price, and hence our bid, are lower than the actual price). Thus,
6For the expected surplus corresponding to other bid-increments, please refer to Appendix B.
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a change in the prediction windows affects both the probability of winning as well
as the average accrued surplus and it is not quite clear how it affects the overall
expected surplus. To that end, we repeat the simulation study from Table 2.5 for
prediction windows of different lengths. Table 2.6 shows the results.
Table 2.6: Tradeoff between the width of the prediction window and expected sur-
plus. The first column denotes the width of the window; the second column denotes
the probability of winning; the third column denotes the average accrued surplus;
and the last column denotes the expected surplus, i.e. exp.sur = (p.win× avg.sur).
prediction window p.win avg.sur exp.sur
14hrs 59.01% $35.29 $20.82
12hrs 61.44% $32.33 $19.80
9hrs 67.82% $30.99 $21.02
6hrs 69.43% $29.60 $20.55
3hrs 75.77% $27.21 $20.62
We can see that larger prediction windows result in a larger average surplus
which suggests that the effect of having a larger pool of candidate auctions out-
weighs the effect of overpayment. But we also see that larger windows result in a
smaller probability of winning since the less accurate predictions more frequently
yield bids below the auction’s actual closing price and hence an unsuccessful auc-
tion. Interestingly, the expected surplus is maximized for a prediction window of 9
hours. While our results do not prove optimality, they suggest a very interesting














Figure 2.10: Process of automated bidding and alternatives.
2.5.4 Practical Considerations
It is important to understand that our automated bidding approach relies on a
number of key ingredients. In this study, we assume that appropriate bidding records
are available and we only focus on deriving a model from these bidding records and
subsequently designing a bidding strategy around that model. Before deploying our
automated bidding approach, one also needs to put in place methods for searching
and selecting the right bidding records (see Figure 2.10). Finding suitable bidding
records can be accomplished in several ways, e.g., using automated agents such as
web crawlers (e.g. [9]) or by directly purchasing bidding data (from data vendors
such as Data Unison). Having a pool of bidding records, the next challenge is to
select, from this pool, the right set of most relevant bidding records. One could
find this set via, e.g., a vector of desired product features (e.g., “iPod Nano, 8GB,
yellow”) and then selecting only those bidding records that are most similar to the
feature vector. Deriving a suitable similarity metric can be done using, for example,
the spatial feature model proposed in [53], or the comprehensive metric proposed
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in Chapter 4. Isolating product features from bidding records is made possible via
eBay’s effort of standardizing certain product descriptions (e.g., product descriptions
for MP3 players require fields such as brand, product line, storage capacity, color or
condition); additional information is often contained in the unstructured descriptive
text which may take more effort to mine.
Related to the issue of search and selection is the issue of incorporating in-
dividual user preferences or risk tolerance into the bidding process. While some
bidders may consider all relevant auctions as potential candidates, others may be
more selective and wish to eliminate auctions based on certain constraints (e.g.,
eliminate auctions with seller ratings lower than a certain threshold, eliminate red
iPods, etc.). This can again be accomplished in the selection step (see again Fig-
ure 2.10). In fact, when applying our method only to high-reputation sellers, the
expected surplus increases to $20.05.
We also want to point out that in practice one would apply our method re-
peatedly until a consumer’s demand is satisfied. We assume here that a consumer
has demand for only a single unit (for more discussion on multiple units see the next
section) and that s/he does not have any time constraints. Then, our automated
strategy would place a bid while continuously monitoring the remaining market –
which could be done at no extra cost for the bidder using automated agents. Once
the outcome of the first bid is known, the strategy would then decide whether and
(if the previous bid was unsuccessful) where to place the next bid, and so on. While
a bidder could also decide to place more than one bid simultaneously, this runs the
risk of winning two auctions which is undesirable in the case a single unit demand.
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It is also important to note that the method proposed in this manuscript
is modular in the sense that individual modules can be exchanged. For instance,
one can replace the dynamic forecasting model by alternatives (such as regression
models with different sets of variables, GAM, CART, or our K-Nearest Neighbor
forecaster proposed in Chapter 4); similarly, one can replace the bidding decisions
by an alternate set of rules. All in all, in order for the approach to be deployed, one
will ultimately have to rely on agent-based technologies, similar to those currently
in place for bid-sniping (e.g. Cniper.com). With such technology in place, our
automated bidding strategy will not only yield real monetary benefits in terms of a
higher expected surplus, but also less tangible benefits such as more convenience in
terms of a truly automated bidding process.
2.6 Conclusions
The increasing popularity of online auctions puts more and more pressure on
bidders to make informed bidding decisions in the face of competition. While classic
bidding strategies such as early bidding or last-minute bidding are well-understood
in the academic literature, they do not account for competition originating from
simultaneous auctions selling same or similar items. Moreover, while it is unlikely
that every bidder uses early or last-minute bidding in exactly the same way, to
date they can only augment and adapt these strategies with gut-feeling, intuition or
experience. We propose a novel automated and data-driven approach that provides
bidders with valuable objective information about an auction’s projected price in
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the face of competition.
Our approach consists of two main components. In the first component, we
derive a novel dynamic forecasting model for price in competing auctions. We show
that our model outperforms several competitor models. In the second component,
we build a comprehensive bidding strategy around our forecasting model, using ideas
from maximizing consumer surplus. We find that our strategy outperforms classical
bidding strategies such as early bidding or last-minute bidding in terms of expected
surplus accrued.
One important issue is the potential effect of a forecasting model on the market
as a whole. If every bidder had access to the same model and bid on the same auction
(with the lowest forecasted price), then forecasts, and as a consequence bidding
decisions, would become unstable. This is very similar to the stock market where
investment houses deploy complex math models to guide investment decisions. In
such a scenario there is a risk that, if all investors base their decisions on the same
model, the model – and not the investments’ performance – could eventually drive
the market. In this research, we are much less ambitious. While, at least in theory,
one single model could eventually drive all bidding decisions on eBay, it is unlikely
that it ever will. Rather, we view our automated bidding strategy, if ever deployed,
as a decision tool that would be made available only to a few, select bidders and
thus not destabilize the market.
There are several ways in which this research can be expanded. We have al-
ready pointed to the problem of selecting the optimal prediction window in Section
2.5.3.1. Another way to expand this research is via allowing for closing and contin-
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uing auctions. Recall that our current approach only consider auctions that close
within the given prediction window. The reason is that our forecasting model is
geared to the fixed time interval (T + 1)− T so we can only predict the final price
of auctions that end within that interval. Of course, one can roll the model one
additional time period forward to make predictions at T +2, based on the predicted
values at T+1; however, predictions two time periods into the future (i.e. T → T+2)
are more uncertain than predictions only one step forward (i.e. T → T + 1). It is
not quite clear how to discount the additional prediction uncertainty in our decision
framework. Another way to expand this research is via allowing for variable and
adaptive WTP distributions. In our simulations, we assume that both early and
last-minute bidders have the same WTP distribution. It may be possible that bid-
ders with different strategies also have different product valuations. Moreover, we
assume that the WTP distribution remains constant over our prediction window.
While this may be realistic for short windows over only several hours, a bidder that
wants an item immediately may have a different valuation compared to a bidder
that is willing to wait several weeks. All-in-all, there are many opportunities for
future research and we hope to inspire some of it with this study.
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Chapter 3
Model Selection for Improved Forecasting
3.1 Introduction
People participate in online bidding day and night and from all over the world
in a competitive fashion which sometimes results in price advantages for the con-
sumer. However, given a choice between several hundred or thousand identical (or
similar) options, all closing at different times, how can a consumer decide – in an
efficient manner – which option results in the lowest possible price?
We accomplish this goal by developing a forecasting model for auction closing
prices. Such models could alleviate the bidder’s decision process by, e.g., ranking all
available auctions by their lowest predicted price (see Chapter 2 for details). The
bidder could then focus his or her bidding efforts only on those, say, K auctions with
the lowest K predicted prices which greatly reduces the number of irrelevant choices
and improves the efficiency of the search task.
One such model was developed in Chapter 2. To build that model, we first
create many features, including static, time varying, and price-dynamics features for
focal and competing auctions, to capture the many different pieces of information
from the market that can affect the outcome of an auction, then conduct model
selection to find our final model. However, the criterion based on which we selected
the final model is rather intuitive.
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Model selection is quite challenging in this setting because the forecasting goal
is different compared to classical time series analysis. In classical time series analysis,
one typically wants to forecast one particular time point of one particular series, such
as sales at the end of the fourth quarter or the gasoline prices at the beginning of
January 2009. This is different in the context of online auctions. In the auction
context, one needs to forecast an entire time window of a stream of simultaneous
auction processes. For example, a bidder discovers the need for a product, such
as a Palm hand-held device on 4/14, and that s/he decides to purchase this item
within the next 12 hours. There are many qualifying auctions available in this online
market; some may close within the next hour, while others remain open for another
9 or 10 hours. Thus, the bidder needs to predict the outcome of each auction that
closes within the next 12 hours. In other words, we need a forecasting model that
not only predicts well at the beginning of the 12 hour time window or at its end,
but during its entire 12 hour duration. Classical model selection criteria such as
AIC or BIC optimize the model performance for only one time point, and are thus
not directly applicable to our situation.
In this study, we investigate different approaches to overcome these challenges.
We address the problem of model selection for a continuous time interval by com-
puting an entire distribution of a model selection criterion rather than only a point
value. In Chapter 2, we intuitively use the average BIC score over the time interval
as the selection rule. We now investigate different ways to summarize this distribu-
tion for decision making and the impact of different distribution summaries on the
prediction task. We find while the volatility of AIC or BIC’s distribution over the
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prediction window results in extremely poor performance, their extremes work very
well. We also find that both price dynamics and competition features play a crucial
component in forecasting an online auction. This work is currently under review at
the Journal of Business and Economic Statistics.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly restate
how to capture all potentially relevant information, both from within an auction as
well as from simultaneously competing auctions as we did in Chapter 2. Section 3.3
proposes an idea to perform model selection with the goal of making good forecasts
across a continuous time interval rather than only a single time point. We conduct
empirical studies using the Palm data set (see Appendix A for data description) to
compare the different approaches, both in terms of the different models they select
as well as in terms of their actual predictive capabilities in Section 3.4. We conclude
with further remarks in Section 3.5.
3.2 Create Features to Capture Important Information
Many different pieces of information potentially matter for the outcome of an
ongoing auction. For example, we have discussed ways to capture dynamics and
competition information for forecasting in Chapter 2. We now summarize features
that are created to capture related information in order to forecast the outcome of
an auction.
The outcome of an auction may be affected by what happens within that
auction. We therefore create a set of features to capture the information from within
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the focal auction, including static information (such as condition of the product or
the rating of the seller), time varying information (such as the number of bidders
and time left), and price-dynamics (e.g. price-velocity and acceleration).
Besides what happens within an auction, the outcome of an auction may also
be affected by what happens outside, that is, in simultaneous auctions that all sell
the same (or similar) product and thus compete for the same bidders. For instance,
the seller ratings, the current prices or the number of bidders in those simultaneous
auctions could all affect the outcome of the focal auction. Therefore, we create
another set of features to capture the information from competing auctions. To
the end, we use the average of the features in concurrent auctions to capture the
average market condition and use the standard deviation to capture the volatility
of the market. For example, the price competition is given by the average and
standard deviation of prices in concurrent auctions, and the average price-velocity
in concurrent auctions would be defined as the average of the corresponding price-
velocities, and so on.
A complete list of created features can be found in Table 2.2 in Chapter 2,
and a more detailed description of creation of all features is described in section
2.3.1 - 2.3.2 in Chapter 2. It is clearly seen that the competition features can be
categorized into static competition features, time varying competition features, and
price-dynamic competition features by the information that they carry. Moreover,
our created features incorporate both price dynamics and competition information
which is necessary for accurately forecasting the extremely dynamic and competitive
environment.
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Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 shows that over 30 different variables are candidates
for our forecasting model. Thus, an important first step in our modeling efforts will
be the selection of a parsimonious subset of relevant variables.











T T+1 hour T+3 hours T+8 hours
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the modeling task.
Our task is to find a model for the auction market. As pointed out earlier, the
market consists of all auctions that sell the same (or similar) item (during a certain
period of time). Take Figure 3.1 for illustration. In that market, we have 3 auctions
selling the same item. What complicates the modeling task is that all auctions start
(and hence end) at different times: one auction ends in the next hour, another one
ends in 3 hours and the third auction ends in a little more than 8 hours. At time T ,
the bidder wants to make a decision on which of the three auctions to bid on. Since
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the bidder’s decision window extends 8 hours into the future, the market model must
consider all time points inside that window. The implication for model selection is
that we need a model that works well not only at a single time point, but across the
entire time window. Thus, our goal is to find a model that best describes price in
this market, taking into account the effect of competition between auctions as well
as differences in price dynamics across auctions.
Forecasting an entire time window is challenging since all statistical models
are geared towards a single time point only. Take for illustration the (intentionally
simple) time series model
yT+1 = yT + εT . (3.1)
(The same argument would apply for more complex models also.) Model (3.1)
implies that, given information up to time point T, we can forecast the response
at time (T+1). However, model (3.1) also implies that we can only forecast the
response at (T+1), and not at (T + 1
2
) or at (T + 2
3
). Thus, the best model selected
(e.g. using model selection criteria such as AIC or BIC) is optimal only for time
steps of length δ := (T + 1) − T , and not for any time steps that are shorter (or
longer). As we’ve argued above, such a model is not very meaningful for the eBay
bidder!
We propose to investigate new model selection criteria that can overcome this
challenge. Model selection has been researched in the statistics literature for a
while [13] and it is receiving increasing attention today with the availability of more
and more data sets featuring larger and larger number of variables [30]. Our goal
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is to find a model that, given a desired time T of decision making, predicts well
universally across an entire time window, say, T + ∆, where ∆ could be as small as
a few hours or as long as a few days, depending on the time frame within which the
bidder wants to place a bid. We describe our idea next.
3.3.1 Model Selection for Time Windows
Classical model selection criteria, such as AIC or BIC, are geared towards
models such as in equation (3.1) and thus only produce pointwise optimal results.
We propose to generalize this idea to apply to entire time windows and thus to
produce a distribution of model selection results.
AIC( )
T+ i T+ kT
Time
Decision Window: 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of model selection criterion.
The basic idea is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Suppose we have a model of the
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form
yT+δ = f(yT , XT ) + εT , δ ∈ [0, ∆], (3.2)
where T denotes the time of decision making, and δ denotes the time increment
which we would like to predict. (While f() could denote any functional relationship
between response and predictors, we consider linear models in our application.) Note
that we let this time increment vary in the interval [0, ∆], where ∆ corresponds to
the length of our decision window.
For each time increment δ, we can compute a corresponding model selection
criterion. Let us assume (for the moment) that we choose Akaike’s information
criterion (AIC) for decision making. (Later, we will also consider alternate model
selection criteria such as the Bayesian Information criterion, BIC.) Then, for each
δ ∈ [0, ∆], we compute AIC(δ) and thus obtain a distribution of model selection
values. This distribution is indicated by the solid black line in Figure 3.2. Note that
we can only compute AIC(δ) for a training set, that is, for a set of data for which
we know all values at T as well as at T + δ. Later, we will apply the model to a
holdout set, that is, a set of data for which we only know values at T and we wish
to predict future values T + δ.
Our objective is to select, among a set of candidate models, a model that
performs well across all time increments δ ∈ [0, ∆]. In practice, there are two chal-
lenges associated with this objective. First, AIC(δ) is measured over the continuous
interval [0, ∆]. Since we cannot evaluate AIC(δ) over a continuous interval, we first
select a fine grid 0 ≤ δ1 < δ2 < · · · < δn ≤ ∆ and then compute AIC(δi) for all
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i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The second challenge is that requiring a model to perform uni-
formly better than all other models does not lead to any results in our application.
In other words, let Mk, k = 1, . . . , K, denote a set of candidate models and let
AICMk(δi) denote the k
th model’s AIC value at time increment δi. Then, in our
application, we may not find any model, say M∗, for which
AICM∗(δi) ≤ AICMk(δi), ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Thus, we resort to an approach where we do not require uniformly better per-
formance, but rather performance that is better as measured by an appropriate
summary statistic of AIC(δ).
We consider several different summary statistics, such as the average, the
extremes as well as the variance, to elicit a model that performs well across the








AICsd := Standard Deviationi{AIC(δi)}
AICmean+sd := AICavg + AICsd
The rationale for investigating these 6 different summary model selection cri-
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teria is as follows. Both AICavg 1and AICmed consider a model’s central performance
and are as such natural candidate selection criteria. However, a model that is per-
forming well on average may not be the best model for decision making. To that
end, AICmin and AICmax consider a model’s extreme performance. While AICmin
points out a model’s best performance, AICmax gauges the worst performance. In
that sense, choosing AICmax for model selection finds the model that minimizes the
worst loss – very similar in spirit to a minimax criterion. On the other hand, AICmin
is the most optimistic selection criterion which identifies the time increment δ and
associated model with the best performance. The next model selection criterion,
AICsd, gauges the volatility of a model’s predictive performance over the interval
[0, ∆]. The rationale is that models with less volatility will, in general, lead to
more stable decision making. The last criterion, AICmean+sd, combines the effect of
good average performance (i.e. small AICavg) and little volatility (i.e. small AICsd).
Since we have no a-priori knowledge on which of these 6 model selection criteria will
perform best, we will let the data speak.
3.3.2 Variable Pre-Selection and Multicollinearity
As we saw in Table 2.2, we have 33 different candidate variables for our fore-
casting model. Our goal is to select the subset of these 33 variables that results in
the best-possible model. There are 8,589,934,591 different ways of selecting a subset
of m, 1 ≤ m ≤ 33, variables, too many to enumerate manually. Moreover, in order
1Notice that compare with the definition for AICavg in Chapter 2, all time points, including
those where AIC (or BIC) is not available due to non-sufficient data for modeling, is now counted
in this definition of AICavg.
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to gauge a model selection criterion’s entire distribution as in Figure 3.2, we need
to evaluate each candidate model on a fine grid 0 ≤ δ1 < δ2 < · · · < δn ≤ ∆ which
becomes computationally infeasible as n becomes larger. Our goal here is not to
derive a computationally efficient algorithm for this task (which would indeed be an
interesting challenge for future research), but rather to illustrate the performance
of the different model selection summary criteria in Equation 3.3. Therefore, we
first preselect a subset of more realistic candidate variables from the total of 33, and
then perform exhaustive search on the remaining variables. We select this subset
of more realistic candidate variables considering potential multicollinearity among
predictors.











Figure 3.3: Pairwise mean correlation among the 33 variables. The x- and y-axes
denote the variable index (between 1 and 33); the color corresponds to the strength
(between -1 and 1) of the pairwise correlation.
To that end, we investigate the pairwise correlations of all 33 variables. Note
that this correlation may change, depending on the density at which a variable is
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measured. Therefore, in similar fashion to above, we first evaluate each variable
at different densities, T + δi, 0 ≤ δi ≤ ∆, and then compute pairwise correlations
between pairs of variables at each density level. After that, we summarize the
correlations in the same way as in Equation 3.3. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show image
plots of the corresponding pairwise mean correlations, minimum correlations and
maximum correlations, respectively.



































Figure 3.4: Pairwise minimum (left panel) and maximum (right panel) correlation
among the 33 variables. The x- and y-axes denote the variable index (between 1
and 33); the color corresponds to the strength (between -1 and 1) of the pairwise
correlation.
We can see that many of the variables are highly correlated. For instance, we
find high collinearity between the current price and c.price.avg, the current price
and c.price.vol, the current price and c.price.disc, the current price and time left,
the current price and c.t.left.avg, the current price and number of bids, the current
price and c.nbids.avg, price-velocity and c.vel.avg, price-velocity and c.vel.vol, and
price-acceleration and c.acc.avg. This high collinearity is not surprising since many
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of these predictors carry similar information, only coded in a slightly different way.
We eliminate all highly collinear predictors. In particular, for each pair of collinear
predictors, we keep the variable that measures price or price-dynamics of the focal
auction (i.e. current price, price-velocity or price-acceleration). While we could also
keep alternate variables, this approach results in the most parsimonious model. In




Table 3.1 lists the 6 candidate variables that we retain for further analysis
including both information from within (price, price-velocity and -acceleration) and
outside (volatility of acceleration, time left and number of bids of competing auc-
tions). For ease of notation, we refer to each variable by a number. For instance,
variable #1 refers to the price, variable #2 refers to the price velocity, and so on.
We now enumerate all possible models based on these 6 variables; that is, we
evaluate a total of 63 different models. For each model, we evaluate the 6 different
summary model selection criteria in equation (3.3), using ∆ = 12 hours and a grid
of 0 ≤ δ1 < δ2 < · · · < δn ≤ ∆ of n = 12 different time increments. We use a
grid-density of δi − δi−1 = 1 hour since, for our data, on average 1 bid arrives every
hour (during the last 12 hours of the auction). We do this for both AIC and BIC
model selection criteria. Tables C.1-C.9 (Appendix C) list all the results.
68
Table 3.1: Variable Index







Table 3.2: Best models according to BIC (top half) and AIC (bottom half). The
number of model parameters is denoted by p. The bold cells correspond to the best
model within each column.
p BICavg BICsd BICmed BICmin BICmax BICmean+sd
1 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 1,2 2,3 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2
3 1,2,3 2,5,6 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
4 1,2,3,5 2,3,5,6 1,2,3,5 1,2,3,6 1,2,3,5 1,2,3,5
5 1-5 2-6 1-5 1-4,6 1-3,5,6 1-5
6 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6
p AICavg AICsd AICmed AICmin AICmax AICmean+sd
1 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 1,2 2,3 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2
3 1,2,3 2,5,6 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3
4 1,2,3,5 2,3,5,6 1,2,3,5 1,2,3,6 1,2,3,5 1,2,3,5
5 1-5 2-6 1-5 1-4,6 1-3,5,6 1-5
6 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6
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Table 3.2 summarizes the results from Appendix C. In each cell, the table lists
the best model for a corresponding combination of (selection criterion)× (number
of model parameters (p)). For instance, the cell corresponding to p = 1 and BICavg
says that the best 1-parameter model picked by BICavg is a model with only the
price (see again Table 3.1 for the index of all variables). The highlighted cell within
each column corresponds to the best model across all values of p (for a specific
selection criterion). For instance, the highlighted cell ({1-5}) in the first column of
the top half says that BICavg picks a model with all variables (except c.nbids.vol)
as the best model across all values of p.
We can make several observations in Table 3.2. First, we note that the cells
in the top half are identical to the cells in the bottom half; this means that both
AIC and BIC pick the same model (given a certain selection criterion and fixed
value of p). However, we also note that the highlighted cells in the top and bottom
tables are not identical; this implies that while for a given p, AIC and BIC result
in the same model, they select different models across p. For instance, while BICavg
picks a 5-parameter model, AICavg picks a 6-parameter model. (Similar for BICmed
and BICmean+sd.) Only BICsd and BICmax select the same models as their AIC
counterparts.
Looking across rows, it is interesting to note that, for a given p, almost all
selection criteria pick the same model – the main exception being BICsd and AICsd.
That is, while BICavg, BICmed, BICmin, BICmax and BICmean+sd almost always agree
on the same model (and similar for their AIC counterparts), BICsd consistently
disagrees. This seems to suggest that using the volatility of the model selection
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distribution measures a very different aspect of model performance compared to its
center or its extremes.
In conclusion, we find that different selection criteria can result in different
models, with the volatility of the model selection distribution showing the strongest
deviations. However, we also want to point out that we have not yet determined
the overall winner. The reason is that we have not yet determined which of the
selected models actually results in the best forecasts. To that end, we investigate
each model’s predictive performance on a holdout set. We discuss this next.
3.4.2 Prediction Accuracy
We measure each model’s predictive capabilities on a holdout set. To that
end, we divide our data into a training set (80% of the data), and a validation
set (remaining 20% of the data). Since our data varies over time (and since we
are primarily interested in making accurate predictions of the future), our training
set consists of all auctions that complete during the first 80% of our data’s time
span (i.e. between March 14 and May 10); the validation set contains all remaining
auctions (i.e. between May 11 and May 25).
We measure predictive performance of a model in terms of its mean absolute








where yi,j and ŷi,j denote the true and predicted values of auction j at time increment
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δi, respectively, and m denotes the number of auctions available. Figures 3.5 and
3.6 show the results.






























































Figure 3.5: Prediction accuracy of the 6 top models. The left panel shows the
prediction accuracy for all 6 models; the right panel shows a zoom-in on the 5 best
models (leaving out the worst model of the right panel). The x-axis corresponds to
the time increment δi, 0 ≤ δi ≤ 12, at which we make a prediction.
The left panel in Figure 3.5 shows the performance of the 6 best models. We
can see that one model (with variables {2-6}) performs extremely poorly relative to
the remaining 5 models. For that model, the prediction error is 8% for forecasting
only one hour into the future; it increases to almost 32% for forecasting 12 hours
into the future. Clearly, that model is not a candidate for the best predictive model;
in order to get a better understanding of the remaining 5 models, we zoom-in (right
panel of Figure 3.5). We can see that, of these 5 models, 2 (with variables {1,2,3,5}
and {1,2,3}) have almost identical performance. We can further distinguish the
performance of these 2 models in Figure 3.6. We can see that model {1,2,3,5}
(slightly) outperforms model {1,2,3} for most time increments (especially for small,
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Figure 3.6: Prediction accuracy of the 5 best models from Figure 3.5. The left panel
shows a zoom-in on the first 4 hours, the right panel shows a zoom-in on the last 3
hours.
e.g. 1 hour, and large, e.g. 12 hour, time increments). We comments further on the
difference of these two models below.
3.4.3 The Winner
Let’s recap: Section 3.4.1 illustrated the performance of each individual sum-
mary model selection criterion and we learned that while different model summarizes
can point to different models, some select the same model. Section 3.4.2 investi-
gated the performance of the top 6 models and we learned that while there is one
clear loser, the two top models perform almost equally well. Now, we connect the
analysis from Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 and we reveal which summary model selection
criterion leads to the best predictive model.
Table 3.3 shows the results. The fist column denotes the name of each model
selection criterion and the second column denotes the best model it selects. (Note
73
that since some selection criteria select the same model, we list more than one name
in the first column). This information is taken from the model-selection analysis in
Section 3.4.1. The remaining 3 columns refer to the prediction-based ranking of each
model. Since the goal is to develop a model that predicts well in the short-term (i.e.
for small time increments) as well as in for medium to longer time increments, we
present 3 different rankings: one for predicting the next hour, one for predicting 6
hours into the future and one for predicting 12 hours into the future. The rankings
are taken from the prediction-accuracy discussed in Section 3.4.2.
We can see that BICmax and AICmax dominate: both criteria find the (same)
model (with variables {1,2,3,5}) that predicts best for short (1 hour) as well as long
(12 hours) time increments. These two criteria are only outdone for the medium
time increment (6 hours) for which BICmin selects the best model (one which drops
variable #5). It is interesting to see that while the maximum as a distribution sum-
mary performs equally well under both AIC and BIC, AICmin performs significantly
worse than BICmin (and similar for the average, medium and medium + sd). Using
the volatility as selection criterion (i.e. BICsd or AICsd) performs uniformly worst.
We can learn from Table 3.3 that the extremes as summaries of the model
selection distribution result in the best performance. Both BICmax and AICmax
select the best model; we pointed out earlier that choosing the maximum – just
like a minimax criterion – protects against the worst loss, so this performance may
not come too much as a surprise. It is more surprising though that BICmin fares
almost equally well; the minimum selects the most optimistic model across all time
increments which seems to suggest that there is not too much heterogeneity across
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Table 3.3: Selected Models and Prediction Accuracy
Selection Selected Prediction Rank
Criteria Model 1 hour 6 hours 12 hours
BICmax, AICmax 1,2,3,5 1 2 1
BICmin 1,2,3 2 1 2
AICmin 1,2,3,6 3 3 4
BICavg,BICmed,BICmean+sd 1-5 4 5 3
AICavg,AICmed,AICmean+sd 1-6 5 4 5
BICsd,AICsd 2-6 6 6 6
different time increments (at least for our data). The performance of the central
statistics (mean, median) is most surprising since, at least intuitively, one would
expect good performance from a model that is selected according to average model
quality. The poor performance of the volatility as a summary measure indicates
that controlling the variability of a model’s quality (around its mean) does not gain
much in terms of predictive accuracy.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we consider model selection when the goal is to find a fore-
casting model that works well across an entire range of time increments, producing
an entire distribution of model selection criteria. We investigate different ways of
decision-making based on that distribution find that the extremes lead to the most
accurate forecasting models.
There are several avenues for future research. As pointed out earlier, efficient
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algorithms are necessary to perform model selection. While classical model selection
can already be very computationally intensive, searching for models that work well
over an entire distribution of time increments multiplies the computational burden.
Moreover, it would be interesting to see if different ways for summarizing the dis-
tribution of a model selection criterion leads to better models, or if summaries can
be combined in a more efficient way.
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Chapter 4
Real-Time Forecasting of Online Auctions via Functional K-Nearest
Neighbors
4.1 Introduction
Online auctions, such as those on eBay.com, have received a surge of popularity
in recent years. This is in part due to their wide accessibility, their low participation
barriers, and also due to the auction mechanism which engages its participants in
stimulating competitive behavior. The popularity of online auctions has lead to a
growth in related research and particularly in the desire to predict the outcome of an
auction before its close. Knowing the auction’s closing price has several advantages
for auction participants. Bidders can use this information to make more informed
(and perhaps even automated) bidding decisions [57]. Sellers can use predictions to
identify times when the market is more favorable to sell their products and to better
evaluate the value of their inventory.
Different approaches have been proposed to predict the price of an ongoing
auction. We used regression-based models to forecast an auction’s final price in a
dynamic fashion in Chapter 2 and 3 (see also [32; 59; 96]). Common across these
models is that they use information from a set of past auctions to predict an ongoing
auction of interest. Moreover, for the purpose of model estimation, they weigh the
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information from each past auction equally. For instance, if the goal is to predict the
price of a laptop auction based on a sample of historical auctions, then estimating a
regression-type model will put equal weight on the information from a Dell laptop
and from an IBM laptop – which may be inappropriate if the goal is to predict
an auction for a Sony laptop. While some of the brand and product differences
can be controlled using appropriate predictor variables, there might still be intrinsic
differences that are hard to measure. An alternative to regression-based models
which was proposed by [16] is a classification and regression tree. However, the
authors point out that the prediction can be poor if prices in each final tree-node
vary significantly. Moreover, while trees, unlike regression, manage to partition the
data in a very flexible way, their predictions, like those of regression, are also based
on the un-weighted information in each final node. In this chapter, we propose a
novel and flexible approach for forecasting online auction prices based on the ideas
of K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN). This work has been recommended for publication
at International Journal of Forecasting with minor revision.
KNN is a forecasting approach that weighs the information from each record
differently, depending on how similar that record is to the record of interest. For
instance, if our goal is to predict the price of an auction for a Sony laptop, then
it will put more weight on information from other Sony laptops and it will down-
weight the information from, say, Dell or IBM laptops. More specifically, KNN
predicts a record based on the weighted average of the K nearest neighbors of that
record, where the weight is proportional to the proximity of the neighbor to the
predicted record. KNN has been proven to converge to the true value for arbitrarily
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distributed samples [91; 23; 63], but studies show that its effectiveness is greatly
affected by the choice of the number of neighbors (K) and the choice of distance
metric [19; 34; 87; 62].
In the context of online auctions, the choice of the distance metric is challeng-
ing because auctions vary on many conceptually different dimensions. In particular,
online auctions vary in terms of three types of information: static, time-varying
and dynamic information. Static information comprises of information that does
not change throughout the auction. This includes product characteristics (e.g.,
brand, product condition), or auction and seller characteristics (e.g., auction length,
whether there is a secret reserve price, or whether the seller is a powerseller). Time-
varying information updates itself during the auction (e.g., the number of bids or
bidders). Both static and time-varying information have been shown to be im-
portant for forecasting the auction price because differences in product or bidding
characteristics all influence bidders’ decisions and hence the final price. Finally,
auctions also vary in terms of their dynamic information. Dynamic information
refers to the price path and its dynamics. These include the price-speed and the
rate at which this speed changes throughout the auction. Auction dynamics are
important for forecasting the final price because an auction that experiences fast
price movements in the earlier stage will likely see a slow-down in price in later
stages; conversely, auctions whose price travels very slowly at the beginning often
see price-accelerations towards the end (e.g. [96; 54; 85]).
Auction price dynamics can be captured via functional objects such as curves.
This means that bids are viewed as a discrete realization of an underlying smooth
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price path. Using smoothing methods (see [88]), this price path is recovered from
the discrete observations and the smoothness of the resulting object allows gauging
of dynamics via taking derivatives. In this chapter, we propose a novel functional
KNN forecaster (fKNN), which combines functional and non-functional data, for
forecasting price in online auctions.
One challenge with functional methods is the choice of smoother. Typical
smoothers include penalized splines (p-splines) or monotone splines (see Section
5.2 in Chapter 5 for more details). However, while p-splines cannot guarantee the
monotonic nature of the auction price growth, monotone splines can be computa-
tionally burdensome. An alternative is to use a flexible parametric approach that
can capture different types of price growth patterns. [45] proposed a set of four
parametric growth models for capturing price paths of online auctions (For details,
see Section 5.2 in Chapter 5). In Section 4.3, we propose a parsimonious parametric
form that generalizes these four growth models. Our parametric model has many ap-
pealing features such as monotonicity and computational efficiency. It is particularly
important within the context of fKNN since it allows us to measure the distance
between auctions’ dynamics in a very parsimonious way via the Kullback-Leibler
distance [12].
Our fKNN forecaster, which integrates information of various types, uses dif-
ferent distance metrics for each data-type. In Section 4.4 we discuss the different
distance measures and how they are combined into a single distance metric.
We also discuss another important aspect of KNN forecasters, which is the
choice of K. While choosing K too small eliminates important information, choosing
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K too large results in noise that deteriorates forecast accuracy. The goal is to find
a value that best balances signal to noise. [91] found that K can depend on the
distribution of the data and that the optimal K often grows with the sample size. In
this study, we investigate the optimal value of K as a function of different distance
metrics as well as of data size and heterogeneity.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the two
sets of eBay data used in this study and discuss their level of heterogeneity. In
Section 4.3, we discuss a flexible parametric model for capturing the price path in
online auctions. Section 4.4 investigates the choice of the distance metric (combining
distance metrics for static, time-varying and dynamic data) and the optimal choice
of K. In Section 4.5, we describe the results of applying the f-KNN forecaster to
the two datasets, and compare it to some competing approaches. We conclude and
discuss possible extensions in Section 4.6.
4.2 Data
We use two datasets from the popular marketplace eBay. The datasets vary
in terms of heterogeneity. The first dataset contains auctions that sell an identical
product - Palm Pilot M515 PDA, while the second dataset contains auctions for
various laptops. Each dataset is described briefly next and in further detail in
Appendix A.
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4.2.1 Palm PDA Auctions
Our first dataset includes the complete bidding records for 380 auctions that
transacted on eBay between March and May, 2003. Each auction sold the same
product, namely, a new Palm M515 handheld device. At the time of data collection,
the market price of the product was about USD $230 (based on Amazon.com). Each
bidding record includes the auction ID, the starting and closing times and prices, all
bids with associated time stamps, and other information such as auction duration,
shipping fee, seller’s feedback score, whether the seller is a power seller, whether
the product is from an eBay store, and whether the auction descriptions include a
picture. All these variables contain information that can affect the final price of the
auction. The complete summary statistics for these variables is presented in Table
A.1 in Appendix A.
We now briefly describe what aspect of the auction process the individual
variables measure and how they are related to the final price. The opening price
is set by the seller and is known to influence the number of bidders the auction
attracts. As for the final price, eBay uses second-price auctions where the winner is
the highest bidder and s/he pays the second highest bid (plus an increment). Hence
the final price is equal to the second highest bid plus an increment. Auctions can
vary in their duration (between 3 and 10 days, in our data), with 7-day auctions
being the default. In terms of auction competition, the average number of bids is
17.45 and the average number of bidders is almost 9. The average shipping fee, set
by the seller, is $15.44. This fee is often perceived as a “hidden cost”. Another
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piece of relevant information is the seller’s feedback score, which is approximately
the number of transactions that the seller completed on eBay. A seller’s feedback
score often proxies for his/her credibility. In our data the highest seller rating is
27,652.
We can also learn from Table A.1 that over 87% of all auctions featured a
picture. Pictures carry visual information about products, thus enhance bidders’
confidence in the quality of the item. Power sellers are sellers with consistently
high volumes of monthly sales, over 98% positive ratings, and PayPal accounts in
good financial standing. We can see that 30% of sellers are power sellers. And
lastly, sellers with feedback scores of 20 or higher, verified ID, and PayPal accounts
in good financial standing are permitted to open “stores” on eBay. Stores provide
easy management of accounts and improved brand boosting when the sellers have
multiple items listed. In our data approximately 30% of all auctions are associated
with an eBay store.
4.2.2 Laptop Auctions
While the Palm PDA dataset is very homogenous in terms of the product sold,
the second dataset consists of auctions for a collection of laptops, featuring products
of many different makes and models.
The data contain information on 4,965 laptop auctions that took place on
eBay between May and June, 2004. Table A.2 in Appendix A summarizes the data.
We can see that while some auction variables are similar to those of the Palm PDA
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data, others are different. For instance, Buy-It-Now auctions are listings that have
the option of a fixed-price transaction and thus forego the auction mechanism. Over
20% of the laptop auctions included that feature. Moreover, a secret reserve price is
a floor price below which the seller is not required to sell. This feature is particularly
popular for high-value auctions. We can see that roughly 30% of all laptop auctions
make use of the secret reserve price feature.
The main difference between the Palm PDA data and the laptop data is that
the latter include products of a wide variety of makes and models. Table A.2 show
that the data include over 7 different brands, and for each brand laptops differ
further in terms of their memory size, screen size, processor speed, whether they are
a new or used product, and whether or not they include an Intel chip or a DVD
player. All-in-all, the products sold in these auctions are of a wide variety which is
reflected in the wide range of closing prices (between $445 and $1,000).
4.3 A Functional Model for Capturing Price Growth Patterns
Our fKNN forecaster includes both functional and non-functional data. By
functional data we mean a collection of continuous objects such as curves, shapes or
images. Examples include measurements of individuals’ behavior over time, digitized
2- or 3-dimensional images of the brain, or recordings of 3- or even 4-dimensional
movements of objects traveling through space and time. In our context, we con-
sider the price path of an online auction. Such data, although often recorded in
discrete fashion, can be thought of as continuous objects represented by functional
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relationships. This gives rise to the field of functional data analysis [79].
Functional data consist of a collection of continuous objects. Despite their
continuous nature, limitations to human perception and measurement capabilities
allow us to observe these objects at discrete time points only. Thus, the first step
in functional data analysis is to recover, from the observed data, the underlying
continuous functional object. This is usually done with the help of data smoothing.
Typical data smoothers include penalized splines or monotone splines [88]. In this
chapter, we suggest a novel approach to recover the functional objects via a Beta
model. The main advantage of the Beta model is that it allows us to measure dis-
tances between two functional objects via the Kullback-Leibler distance. In contrast
to penalized splines, it guarantees monotonicity of the resulting functional object,
which is important for modeling monotonic price growth behavior in auctions. Com-
pared to monotone splines (which also result in monotonic representations), the Beta
model is computationally much more efficient1. Recently, [45] proposed a family of
four growth models for representing auction price paths. Our approach via the Beta
model generalizes this idea and includes the four growth models as special cases.
4.3.1 The Beta Model
We model an auction’s price path using the Beta cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF). The Beta distribution is a continuous probability distribution defined
on the interval [0, 1] with two shape parameters, α and β, that fully determine the
1We use the popular R function smooth.monotone in the fda package. An alternative is to
use the pcls function (and accompanying functions gam, smoothCon, and mono.con) in the mgcv
package, which is computationally more efficient, but from our experience it produces inferior fits.
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distribution. Its CDF can be written as






where B(α, β) is the beta function2 ([1]), a normalization constant in the CDF to
ensure that F (1, α, β) equals to unity.
We model auction price paths with the Beta CDF in the following way. Let p
denote the sequence of observed prices with associated time-stamps t. Since auctions
can be of varying durations, we normalize the time sequence by tn = t/Duration,
which yields time-stamps between 0 and 1. Similarly, auctions close at different
prices, so we normalize the observed prices by pn = p/ClosingPrice which yields




uα−1(1− u)β−1du/B(α, β) for every element of pn and tn.
In the context of real-time forecasting, we only observe price paths up to some
time T (with associated price P ). We therefore estimate α and β by normalizing the
time and price scales to [0, T ] and [0, P ], respectively (i.e. tn = t/T and pn = p/P ).
Estimation is done by error minimization (The algorithm for efficiently fitting the
Beta model to auction data is described in detail in Section 5.3.1 in Chapter 5).
Figure 4.1 shows typical paths produced by the Beta model for different values
of α and β. The solid black line represents the case of rapid price growth at the
beginning and at the end, but only little growth during the middle; this case would























Figure 4.1: Typical price paths based on the Beta CDF with varying shape para-
meters (α, β)
little bidding activity in between – a case that is pretty common on eBay. The solid
gray represents auctions that experience little bidding activity during most of the
auction with bidding picking up only towards the end. In contrast, the dotted black
line corresponds to auctions with high early activity which levels off as the auction
progresses. And lastly, the dashed gray line corresponds to auctions where most of
the bidding occurs during the middle part (and not at the beginning or the end), a
case that, while rather uncommon, occurs from time to time on eBay.
One important consequence of the Beta model is its closed form of represen-
tation of price dynamics and acceleration by the first and second order derivatives
of the price∼time model. Besides this, there are other nice properties of the beta
model which make it advantageous over existing models. We will explore those
properties in Chapter 5.
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4.3.2 Model Estimation
We estimate the Beta model for our auction data in a way that optimizes fit
in both the x and y directions. In the auction context, the x direction corresponds
to time and a good fit in that direction is necessary in order to accurately capture
points of different bidding activity (e.g., early or last-minute bidding). We also
require our model to fit well in the y-direction, which corresponds to price. A good
fit in y-direction will guarantee accurate forecasts of an auction’s final price which
is the main goal of this study.
Since we fit the model in both x and y directions, we measure goodness of fit
by examining the residual error in both directions. For the ith auction with n bids,







0.5(yk − ŷk)2 + 0.5(xk − x̂k)2
]
,
which is the average of the sum of squared errors in both x and y directions. Note
that the smaller the residual error, the better our model represents the auction
price-path.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the model fit for the Palm PDA data. The left panel
shows the distribution of residuals for the Beta model; the other two panels show
the corresponding distributions for the growth models [45] and penalized splines,
respectively. We can see that the Beta model results in the best model fit, i.e. in
the smallest residual error3. The results are very similar for the laptop auctions.
























































Figure 4.2: Residual comparison for fitting three models: Beta model (left), growth
model (middle), and p-splines (right).
4.3.3 Kullback-Leibler Distance
Since the fKNN forecaster uses both functional and non-functional data, we
must define distance measures for both data types. While there exist standard
measures for the distance between non-functional data (e.g., Euclidian distance),
measuring the distance between functional data (e.g., between two curves) is more
involved because of infinite dimensionality. One of the main advantages of the Beta
model is that it allows us to measure the distance between two auction price paths
in a very parsimonious way via the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance.
The KL distance [68] is a non-commutative measure of the difference between
two probability distributions. For two distributions X and Y , it measures how Y
differs from X. The KL distance is widely used in the field of pattern recognition
for feature selection (e.g. [12]) or in physics for determining the states of atoms or
other particles (e.g. [75]). In our case, X and Y both refer to the Beta distribution
with parameters α, β, and α′, β′, respectively. The KL distance between X and Y
89
is then given by a very simple function of the Beta parameters [81]:





where B and ψ denote the Beta and Digamma function, respectively ([1]).
Returning to the four auctions in Figure 4.1, consider the solid black line
(Beta(0.5, 0.5)) as the focal auction that we want to forecast. Using equation (4.2),
the KL distance to the focal auction is 9.69 from the solid gray line (Beta(5, 1)), 6.40
from the dotted black line (Beta(1, 3)), and 7.10 from the dashed gray line(Beta(2, 2)).
While the dashed gray line may, at least visually, not appear very distant from the
focal auction, its distribution is in fact very different, as captured by the KL dis-
tance.
4.4 Functional K-Nearest Neighbors (fKNN)
In this section we discuss the components of our functional KNN forecaster.
We start by explaining the basic forecasting idea and then discuss the two main
elements of our fKNN implementation: the choice of a suitable distance metric and
the choice of K.
4.4.1 Overview
Our goal is to predict the final price of an ongoing auction. Consider Figure











Figure 4.3: Illustration of the forecasting idea.
until time T . The dotted line corresponds to the (future) price path until the
close of the auction. Our goal is to predict the closing price. As the closing price
is determined by the current price plus the price-increment 4f , our forecasting
problem is equivalent to predicting 4f . We will therefore use fKNN to estimate 4f
based on a training set of completed auctions.
In order to estimate4f , we look for the K most similar auctions in the training
set. Consider Figure 4.4 for illustration. In that scenario, we have a training set
with 6 auctions, 41 – 46. We also have associated distances, D1–D6, between the
focal auction and each of the auctions in the training set. If K equals 3, then we






























Figure 4.4: Illustration of forecasting scheme.






As we can see in equation (4.3), the two main elements of this approach are
the choice of K and the choice of a distance metric D. We discuss these next.
4.4.2 Choice of Distance Metric
As pointed out earlier, online auction data comprise of three types of infor-
mation: Static information captures information that does not change during the
course of the auction, time-varying information that changes during the auction, and
auction dynamics, which are captured and represented by functional data. Table
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4.1 summarizes the three types and the specific variables for each data type. We
now discuss distance metrics for both data-types.








Static Binary buy-it-now, reserve price, condi-
tion
Categorical brand
Time-Varying Interval number of bids, current price
Functional Functional price-velocity, -acceleration
4.4.2.1 Static and Time-Varying Data
Static and time-varying information includes data measured on different scales
(interval, binary and categorical). Following [53], we use separate metrics for each
individual scale, and then combine the individual metrics into an overall distance
metric for non-functional data.
For binary data xB and x
′
B (e.g., an auction with the buy-it-now option vs. an
auction without that feature), we define the distance as
dB = 1(xB 6= x′B), (4.4)
where 1 denotes the indicator function and thus dB equals 1 if and only if xB 6= x′B;
otherwise it is 0.
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We adopt a similar measure for categorical data. For instance, the categorical
variable “brand” can assume 8 different levels (Dell, Fujitsu, Gateway, etc) which
can be coded as a vector of 7 different binary variables. Thus, each categorical
variable can be represented as a set of binary variables. Let xC and x
′
C denote
two vectors representing categorical data, then we define their distance, similar to
equation (4.4), as
dC = 1(xC 6= x′C), (4.5)
which takes the value of 1 if and only if xC 6= x′C , and 0 otherwise.
For interval-scaled data xI and x
′
I (e.g. two auctions with different opening
prices), we use a scaled version of the Minkowski metric [47]:
dI =
|x̃I − x̃′I |
R̃I
, (4.6)
where x̃ denotes the standardized value of x, and R̃ denotes the range of x̃. The
advantage of the Minkowski metric is that it renders interval-scaled data onto the
interval [0, 1]. Note that the maximum and minimum values of dI are 1 and 0
respectively, which are also the values taken by the binary and categorical distance
metrics in equations (4.4) and (4.5). Having metrics in comparable magnitudes
makes it easier to combine individual distance metrics.
We combine individual distance metrics in the following way. Let x = {x1, x2, ..., xp}
be a vector of p non-functional features, including binary, categorical and interval
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where d∗ denotes the appropriate individual distance metric from equations (4.4)-
(4.6).
As an example, let x and x′ be two three-feature vectors. Specifically, x ={w/
buy-it-now, dell, 1G memory} and x′ ={w/o buy-it-now, IBM, 1G memory}. The
first, second and third features are binary, categorical, and interval scaled, respec-
tively. Using equation (4.7), d(x, x′) = 1/3(d1 + d2 + d3), where d1 = 1 based on
equation (4.4), d2 = 1 based on equation (4.5), and d3 = 0 based on equation (4.6).
The overall distance between x and x′ is therefore 2/3.
Note that the definition of d in (4.7) is flexible in the sense that one can use
only subsets of the available information. For instance, dStatic would refer to the
distance metric using only static information, while dTime−V arying would refer to the
metric with only time-varying information. One problem with distance metrics of
this type is that they may over-weigh different sources of information, depending on
how elaborately each source is recorded. For instance, a data set with 100 different
static features and only 10 time-varying features puts 10-times more weight on the
information from static features. In order to overcome this potential bias, we follow
the ideas of [14] and first scale each individual distance metric by its mean root
square (MRS). MRS is a statistical measure of the magnitude of a vector. For a







i [70]. We apply the same
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scaling to each individual distance metric and obtain
dStatics = d
Static/MRS(dStatic) (4.8)
dTime−V aryings = d
Time−V arying/MRS(dTime−V arying) (4.9)





Note that the combined metric dStatic&Time−V aryings now puts equal weight on both
static and time-varying information.
4.4.2.2 Dynamics (Functional Data)
As shown in Section 4.3.3, we can measure the distance between two func-
tional observations using the KL distance. Let (α, β) and (α′, β′) denote the Beta
parameters for two different auction price paths, then their distance (when x is the
focal auction) is defined as
dF = |DKL(x, x′)| , (4.11)
where DKL(x, x
′) is defined in equation (4.2).
Note that dF ranges within [0, +∞) as the KL distance assumes values on
the real line. In order to make dF comparable with the non-functional distance
measures, we again scale it using the MRS transformation. Thus we obtain
dDynamicss = d
F /MRS(dF ). (4.12)
96
4.4.2.3 Optimal Distance Metric
To determine which combination of individual distance metrics leads to the
best forecasting model, we investigate a series of different distance metrics. In par-














We first determine the optimal metric based on a validation set and then investigate
the predictive accuracy of the resulting fKNN forecaster on a test set.
4.4.3 Choice of K
The second important component of fKNN is the choice of K, the number of
neighbors from which the forecasting is calculated. Too small a value will filter out
relevant neighbors; too big a value will introduce noise and weaken the prediction.
[91] finds that the optimal value of K is data-dependent, and it usually grows
with the sample size. In additional, K may also vary as different distance metrics
are used. Therefore, we select the optimal value of K separately for each distance
metric and each data set. To do so, we again select the best value of K based on a
validation set; we then apply the resulting model to the test set.
4.4.4 Forecasting Scheme
Our complete forecasting process includes determining the optimal distance
metric and the optimal value of K. We determine both based on a validation set.
Then, using the optimal metric and K, we estimate the fKNN model based on
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the records in the training set. We investigate the performance of that model by
predicting a new focal auction using auctions from a test set.
4.4.5 Comparison With Alternate Methods
We benchmark our fKNN forecaster against two other very popular predic-
tion methods: parametric regression models, and nonparametric regression trees
(CART).
In a linear regression model, the closing price is modeled as a linear function
of the observed predictor information. This information can include some or all of
the three types of data from Table (4.1). Note that in such models, all auctions
from the training set are weighed equally when estimating the model coefficients.
CART forecasting takes a hierarchical approach. It recursively partitions the
data into smaller sub-groups; the focal auction is then forecasted based on the
average of the most relevant sub-group. While CART, like KNN, uses neighboring
information from similar auctions, it weighs each auction equally, which is one major
aspect in which it differs from KNN.
We discuss differences in prediction performance next.
4.5 Results
We now discuss the predictive performance of our functional KNN forecaster
when applied to the two datasets of eBay auctions, and compare it with competing
approaches. We also investigate the optimal distance metric and the optimal value
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of K. The two datasets, Palm PDAs and laptops, are different in their level of
heterogeneity. While the Palm PDA dataset is very homogeneous, the laptop data
are very heterogeneous. We also investigate different time horizons, that is, we
investigate forecasting different distances into the future.
We split each of the two datasets into a training set (50% of the auctions),
a validation set (25%) and a test set (25%). We split the data according to the
temporal nature of our prediction task. That is, auctions in the training set transact
prior to those in the validation set; and auctions in the test set transact after those
in the validation set. Therefore, our experiments mimic the prediction task that
real bidders face.
For the competing models (regression and CART), we train the models on the
combined training and validation set, and then test their predictive performance on
the test set.










where yi and ŷi denote the true and estimated final price in auction i, respectively.
4.5.1 Selecting the Optimal K and the Optimal Distance Metric
We select the optimal value of K in the following way. Recall that we have
5 candidate metrics, D ∈ {dStatics , dTime−V aryings , dDynamicss , dStatic&Time−V aryings , dAlls }.
For each metric, we select a value of K from the set K ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 100}. For each
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combination of (D ×K), we estimate the corresponding fKNN model on the training
set, then measure its predictive accuracy (in terms of MAPE) on the validation set.
Figure 4.5 shows the results. The left panel shows the results for the laptop auctions;
the right panel shows the corresponding Palm PDA results. The top panel shows
an overview, the bottom panel zooms-in on the most relevant part.
From the left panel in Figure 4.5 (laptop auctions) we can see that dDynamicss
results in the worst model performance, regardless of the value of K. In other words,
using only the dynamic information of the price path is not sufficient for achieving
good prediction accuracy. We also see that, of the remaining 4 distance metrics, dAlls
yields the uniformly lowest prediction error. This suggests that for laptop auctions,
due to their diversity in makes and models, every single piece of auction information
is necessary to achieve good prediction accuracy. Moreover, we note that for dAlls , the
lowest prediction error is achieved at K = 41. We conclude that D = dAlls together
with K = 41 results in the best predictions. The story is somewhat different for
the Palm PDA data (right panel in Figure 4.5). For those data, D = dTime−V aryings
results in the uniformly lowest error (across all distances). Moreover, choosing K=2
optimizes that distance.
It is interesting that the two different data sets result in very different choices
for K and D. While for the laptop data, we need all auction information (using
the distance metric dAlls ) and a very large neighborhood (via K=41), the Palm PDA
auctions require only the time-varying information of the auction process (using D =
dTime−V aryings ) and a very small neighborhood (via K=2). One possible explanation
lies in the difference in heterogeneity between the two data sets. In the homogeneous
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Figure 4.5: Optimal values of K and D. The left panel shows the results for the
laptop auctions; the right panel shows the corresponding Palm PDA results. The
top panel gives an overview, the bottom panel zooms-in on the most relevant part.
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data (Palm PDA), all products are the same and differences in auction outcome will
be mostly due to differences in the current price and the level of competition for
that product. The competition level is reflected in the number of bids and bidders,
which, together with the price level, are captured in dTime−V aryings . Moreover, since
products are very homogeneous, we only need a very small neighborhood, thus
K=2. This is different for the laptop auctions. In that data set, products are
very heterogeneous, thus the forecaster needs all available information (in dAlls ) to
distinguish between more relevant samples. Since the products are very different,
the method also requires a larger neighborhood which leads to a larger value of K.
This suggests that, as expected, forecasting more heterogeneous auctions is a more
difficult task.
4.5.2 Robustness of Optimal D and K to the Time Horizon
In the previous section, we investigated the interplay of K and D for a fixed
time horizon of 1 minute. That is, we assumed that we observe the auction until 1
minute before its close. We now investigate the robustness of this choice for different
time horizons. Specifically, we investigate the robustness of K and D for different
time horizons (δT ) in the set δT ∈ { 2h, 1h, 30 min, 15 min, 5 min, 1 min}.
4.5.2.1 Robustness of Optimal K
Figure 4.6 investigates the robustness of K to the choice of δT . For a given
value of K (K ∈ {20, 40, 60, 80, 100} for the laptop data and K ∈ {2, 5, 10, 50, 100}
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for the Palm PDA data), we investigate the prediction accuracy for different values
of δT . We hold D fixed at D = d
All
s for the laptop data and D = d
Time−V arying
s
for the Palm data. Figure 4.6 shows the relative prediction error Rel.MAPEK :=
MAPEK/MAPEK∗ , relative to a benchmark value (K
∗ = 40 for the laptop data,
K∗ = 5 for the Palm PDA data).
We see that for the laptop data (top panel in Figure 4.6), lower values of K
(K=20) lead to poor performance. We also see that while K=40 generally leads to
good forecasting accuracy, it is outperformed by higher K-values when forecasting
time horizons of 30 or 15 minutes. This suggests that the value of K is not very
robust to the time horizon. It is even less robust for the Palm PDA data (bottom
panel in Figure 4.6), where K=5 leads to good forecasting performance only for
very long time horizons (δT = 2h); in contrast, choosing K=2 leads to the best
performance for very short horizons (δT = 1 min). This suggests that the choice
of K should be a function of δT . Table 4.2 lists the optimal value of K for each
combination of δT and D.
4.5.2.2 Robustness of Optimal D
We now investigate the impact of the time horizon δT on the choice of the
distance metric D. Figure 4.7 shows the prediction accuracy as a function of the
time horizon δT for different choices of D. Note that for each combination of D and
δT , we use the optimal values of K from Table 4.2.































































Figure 4.6: Relative prediction accuracy for different values of K at different time
horizons δT . The left panel corresponds to the laptop data; and the right panel













































Figure 4.7: Comparison of different distance metrics. The left panel is for laptop
auctions; and the right panel is for palm auctions.
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Table 4.2: Optimal choice of K for different distance metrics D and different time
horizons δT . The top panel corresponds to the laptop data; the bottom panel is for
the Palm PDA data.
Laptop Data
Time Horizon 2h 1h 30min 15min 5min 1min
static 95 94 99 99 81 14
time-varying 31 27 97 100 91 89
dynamics 100 100 100 100 100 100
static&time-varying 40 79 100 96 47 44
all 33 77 98 100 44 41
Palm PDA Data
Time Horizon 2h 1h 30min 15min 5min 1min
static 52 69 63 63 61 37
time-varying 3 10 4 1 1 2
dynamics 94 95 95 29 29 68
static&time-varying 7 18 32 52 12 8
all 6 40 30 61 11 2
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for the Palm PDA data. Each line corresponds to a distance metric D ∈ {dStatics ,






s }. We can see that, for each data
set, a single distance metric yields the consistently best result across all values of
the time horizon. That is, dAlls results in the best prediction accuracy for the laptop
data, regardless of the value of δT ; similarly, d
Time−V arying
s yields the best results for
all values of δT in the Palm PDA data. This suggests that the choice of the distance
metric is very robust to the forecasting horizon, at least for a given data set. We also
note that while dTime−V aryings significantly outperforms all other distance metrics for
the Palm PDA data, for the laptop data most choices of D (except for dDynamicss )
yield very comparable results, at least for short time horizons (δT ≤ 30 min).
4.5.3 Comparison With Alternate Prediction Methods
We evaluate the performance of functional KNN by comparing its predictive
accuracy to more classical approaches – linear regression models and tree (CART)4.
We study the performance of all methods on the test set. Recall that we
partitioned our data into a training set (50%), validation set (25%) and test set
(25%). While we estimated the fKNN forecaster on the training set and optimized
its parameters K and D on the validation set, we now compare its performance
(using the optimal parameter values) on the test set. That is, for each time horizon
δT , we use the optimal combination of K and D from the previous section. In
order to make fair comparisons, we apply regression and CART using the same
4We used the software defaults for pruning in CART; that is, we used the defaults in the R
package rpart.
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information as for functional KNN.
Figure 4.8 shows the results. We display the relative prediction error between
fKNN and the regression model (dotted line) and between fKNN and the tree model
(dashed line). We can see that fKNN generally outperforms its two competitors.
In particular, for the laptop data (left panel), fKNN outperforms the tree model
by as much as 40%. While the gap between the regression model and fKNN is
smaller, fKNN leads to improvements that range between 5% and 10%. The picture
is similar for the Palm PDA data (right panel). While for this data set fKNN also
leads to general improvements, it is curious to see that only for the longest time











































Figure 4.8: Comparison of different forecasting methods. The left panel corresponds
to laptop auctions; the right panel is for the Palm PDA auctions.
It is revealing to compare performance on each of the two data sets. While
for the laptop data, both fKNN and regression significantly outperform CART, the
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Figure 4.9: Optimal values of K for the Palm PDA data at δT = 15 min. The left
panel corresponds to the validation set; the right panel corresponds to the test set.
gap is not as large in the Palm PDA data; in fact, for the Palm PDA data, CART
and regression are comparable for almost all time horizons. The poor performance
of CART on the laptop data illustrates the general problem of the method with
prediction: while it often fits the training set well, it has a tendency to over-fit
and thus perform poorly on the test set, especially in situations like the laptop
data where the underlying population is very heterogeneous. On the other hand,
functional KNN can handle heterogeneous populations well by selecting only those
neighbors that are most relevant for the focal auction; in particular, compared to
regression, it performs especially well for forecasting longer time horizons (one hour,
two hours), which is very relevant in practical situations.
Functional KNN also leads to improvements for less heterogeneous data sets
such as the Palm PDA data. While the right panel in Figure 4.8 suggests that
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fKNN outperforms both competitors for every time horizon, there is a sharp drop
for the competitors at δT ≤ 15 min. At this point, both regression and the tree
model perform almost as well as fKNN. A closer investigation of this phenomenon
reveals that for this time horizon, the optimal value of K (based on the validation
set) equals one (see left panel in Figure 4.9); however, that value leads to very poor
performance on the test set (right panel in Figure 4.9). This suggests that finding
the right value of K is especially difficult for homogeneous data sets (such as the
Palm PDA data). While the data-homogeneity suggests very small values of K,
slight perturbation of the homogeneity can lead to weaker results. This was already
implied by the lack of robustness seen in Section 4.5.2.1.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose a novel functional KNN forecaster for forecasting
the final price of an ongoing online auction. Assuming that more similar auctions
contain more relevant information for incorporation into forecasting models, we
propose a novel dissimilarity measure that takes into account both static and time-
varying features as well as the auction’s price dynamics information. The latter is
obtained via a functional representation of the auction’s price path. We select both
the optimal distance metric as well as the optimal number of neighbors based on a
validation set. We find that weighting information unequally yields better forecasts
compared to classical methods such as regression models or trees, and this result
holds in auctions of varying levels of heterogeneity. Moreover, the proposed Beta
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model has many nice properties as a representation of auction price path besides
providing distance measures for functional price curves. We explore those properties
in further detail in the next Chapter.
Although we observe improvement of the KNN forecaster over regression and
CART for auctions of varying levels of heterogeneity, our study shows that the
improvement is bigger for heterogeneous data. This means that selecting the most
useful information and making use of only most relevant neighbors is especially
crucial for prediction accuracy in situations where objects are heterogeneous and
information is noisy. This fact is true not only for forecasting online auctions but
also in many other forecasting situations (e.g., weather forecasting). Another finding
worth noticing is the robustness of the optimal distance to the time horizon. The
fact that the same distance metric is optimal regardless of the time horizon implies
that the most important information for making price prediction is time-invariant.
This insight simplifies the process of decision making. To compute forecasts, we
only need to find the optimal distance once, and this distance can then be re-used
as the forecasting process proceeds.
There are several ways to extend this study. While we scale distance metrics
for different information sources to achieve equal weighing across all metrics, one
could alternatively assign individual weights to individual metrics and then optimize
the weights. There are also alternative ways to define distances for different data
types. For example, for categorical data we can define several levels of category
“similarity”, such as “US brand”. Then, the distance between items can be set to
0.5 for “similar categories” (e.g., US brand) or 1 for categories more different.
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Another way to complement this study is by investigating alternates to clas-
sical linear regression and trees, e.g. via weighted regression or tree models, which
might lead to forecasting advantages especially for heterogeneous data.
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Chapter 5
A Flexible Model for Price Dynamics in Online Auctions
5.1 Introduction
One stream of online auction research has focused on the dynamics of the
auction price paths which leads to deeper understanding of price formation process.
Descriptive studies have shown that price dynamics can be very heterogeneous, even
for auctions of the same product (e.g. [51; 82]). Furthermore, statistical approaches,
such as functional data analysis, has been developed and employed in providing
insight into price dynamics [52; 10; 86].
Price dynamics have also been shown instrumental for price forecasting. [96]
pioneered real-time forecasting models for ongoing auctions where price dynamics
serve as important predictors. [57] recently expanded upon this idea. Both stud-
ies show that the inclusion of the dynamic information adds additional predictive
power to the forecasting model compared to models that do not make use of such
information.
In summary, the price path and the price dynamics are of special interest in
online auctions, and therefore developing models that can capture them effectively
are both important and useful. In Chapter 4, we have briefly introduced a Beta
model for capturing the price path and its dynamics; and it is employed to help
measure distances between auction price paths. The Beta model is parsimonious,
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flexible, and computationally efficient. In this Chapter we further explore the prop-
erties of the beta model, compare our model to alternative existing models and show
its advantages both in terms of fit as well as forecast accuracy. This work has been
submitted to the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society C for review.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents ex-
isting models for capturing price path and dynamics in online auctions. In section
5.3, we introduce our Beta model and describes its properties, estimation, and ad-
vantages over alternate approaches. We then compare the Beta model to several
competitors empirically in Section 5.4, in terms of fit as well as forecast accuracy.
We conclude in Section 5.5.
5.2 Models for Auction Price Paths
Dynamics (e.g. velocity or acceleration) are typically computed as the first
or second derivative of an underlying smooth function. However, observed bids
create a non-decreasing step function with jumps at the times of bids (see e.g.
Figure 2.1). Thus, in order to gauge an auction’s price dynamics, one needs some
smooth representation of the price path. There have been two general approaches
to obtaining smooth auction price paths from observed bid data: non-parametric
and parametric. Using a functional data analytic (FDA) approach, [54] employed
penalized smoothing splines (p-splines) to generate smooth curves. An alternative to
p-splines are monotone splines [78] which guarantee the monotonicity of the resulting
curves. Finally, [45] proposed a parametric family of four distributions that capture
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an auction’s most typical price path shapes. Each of these three approaches yield
smooth price curves, and then price dynamics are computed by taking derivatives of
the smooth curves. The first derivative captures price velocity (i.e. how fast the price
is moving at any point in time); the second derivative captures price acceleration,
and so forth.
In the following we describe each of these three approaches and discuss their
strengths and weaknesses.
5.2.1 Smoothing Splines
Penalized smoothing splines (p-splines) [88] fit a polynomial of order p. In
order to control the smoothness of the fitted curve, a penalty is imposed on the
estimating function. Let τ1, τ2, . . . , τL be a set of knots, then a polynomial spline of
order p is given by
f(t) = β0 + β1t + β2t





where u+ = uI(u ≥ 0) is the positive part of the function u. Many functions of
this type tend to fit the data too closely (and thus model noise in addition to the
signal); therefore, a roughness penalty approach is often employed which takes into
account the trade off between data-fit (i.e., minimizing f(t) =
∑
j(yj − f(tj))2) and
function smoothness. A popular measure of roughness, which measures degree of
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where Dmf, m = 1, 2, 3, . . . denotes the mth derivative of the function f . A highly
variable function will yield a high value of PENm(x). If the highest derivative of
interest is m, then using m + 2 as the polynomial order will assure m continuous
derivatives. The penalized smoothing spline f minimizes the penalized squared error
PENSSEλ,m =
∫
(y(t)− f(t))2 + λPENm(t). (5.3)
When the roughness parameter is set to λ = 0, the penalized squared error drops
out, and the function fits the data perfectly. Larger values of λ penalize the function
for being curvy, and as λ →∞, the fitted curves approach a linear regression.
Smoothing splines are widely used in functional data analysis. They are ad-
vantageous in terms of their flexibility which results in good data-fits, in terms of
their ease of obtaining derivatives (i.e. dynamics) and in terms of their compu-
tational efficiency. However, there are several challenges when applying penalized
smoothing splines to the online auction context. Firstly, although bidding data are
non-decreasing over time, smoothing splines do not necessarily result in monotoni-
cally non-decreasing curves. Hence, they may not truly reflect the monotonic nature
of the auction price process. Second, the fitted curves are often very variable, espe-
cially at their ends, even with a heavy smoothness penalty. This is problematic in
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the auction context, where the opening and closing prices are of special importance.
Moreover, in a forecasting context it is crucial to obtain precise estimates at the final
stages of the auction (see Chapter 2 and [96]). Finally, smoothing splines require
the specification of many nuisance parameters (such as the smoothing parameter,
the number and position of knots, and the polynomial order) which are often deter-
mined in an ad-hoc fashion. While one can estimate some of these parameters from
the data (e.g., using cross-validation), their optimal choice is not always guaranteed.
5.2.2 Monotone Splines
Monotone splines [78] are a natural alternative to smoothing splines in the
online auction context, since they guarantee a monotone path of the resulting price
process. The idea behind monotone smoothing is that monotonously increasing
functions have a positive first derivative. The exponential function has this property
and can be described by the differential equation f ′(t) = w(t)f(t). This means that
the rate of change of the function is proportional to its size. Consider the linear
differential equation
D2f(t) = w(t)Df(t). (5.4)
Here, w(t) = D
2f(t)
Df(t)
, which is the ratio between acceleration and velocity. The
differential equation has the following solution:










where t0 is the lower bound over which we are smoothing. After some substitutions
(see [79]), we can write
f(t) = β0 + β1e
wt. (5.6)
and estimate β0, β1, and w(t) from the data. Since w(t) has no constraints it may be
defined as a linear combination of K known basis functions (i.e., w(t) =
∑
k ckφk(t)).








For capturing online auction price paths and dynamics, monotone smooth-
ing indeed solves the excess variability of penalized smoothing splines and their
non-monotonicity problems. The resulting curves are better representations of a
continuous non-decreasing price path, and dynamics can be computed via curve
derivatives. However, some challenges remain and new ones arise. First, monotone
smoothing is computationally intensive, as it relies on an iterative fitting process
where several passes have to be made through the data. Therefore, fitting a dataset
of even tens or hundreds of auctions can take a long time. Second, like smooth-
ing splines, there are many nuisance parameters to be determined (the number and
location of knots and the smoothing parameter). Hence, while, at least conceptu-
ally, monotone splines are preferable over smoothing splines, they can be slow to
implement even with medium-sized datasets.
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5.2.3 Parametric Growth Models
To overcome the disadvantages of smoothing splines and monotone splines,
[44] proposed a family of four growth models for representing the price process.
They find that the shape of auction price paths can be categorized into four main
types: exponential growth, logarithmic growth, logistic growth, and reflected-logistic
growth. These four models not only provide parametric fit of monotone data, but
they also have appealing interpretations, and are easy to estimate. We describe each
of the four models next.
5.2.3.1 The Exponential Model
Exponential growth has been used for describing a variety of natural phe-
nomena including the dissemination of information, the spread of disease, and the
multiplication of cells in a petrie dish. In exponential growth the rate of growth is
proportional to a function’s current magnitude; that is, growth follows the differen-
tial equation
Y ′(t) = rY (t), (5.8)
or the equivalent equation
Y (t) = Aert, (5.9)
where t denotes time, and r > 0 is the growth constant. Equivalently, exponential
decay, when r < 0, can model phenomena such as the half-life of an organic event. In
an online auction context, exponential growth describes a price process with gradual
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price increases until mid-to-late auction, and a heavy price jump towards the end.
5.2.3.2 The Logarithmic Model








The resulting curves are reflections of exponential growth over the line x = y.
In the online auction context, such behavior occurs when early bidding quickly in-
creases the price during the opening stages of the auction, but because of market
constraints (e.g. a market value or budget constraints), price flattens out for the re-
mainder of the auction. This type of price behavior tends to be rare, as most bidders
do not wish to reveal their valuations early in the auction. However, inexperienced
bidders who may not completely understand eBay’s proxy bidding mechanism, may
place high early bids.
5.2.3.3 The Logistic Model
Logistic growth is useful for describing processes which reach a limit or a “car-
rying capacity”. In the context of auction prices, in many cases there are competing
online and brick-and-mortar markets for the auctioned item, thereby creating a
“market value” for the item.
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and the differential equation is




where L is the carrying capacity, t is time, r is the growth rate, and C is a constant.
Logistic growth can also be explained in the auction context as a stretched-out “S”-
shaped curve, where the price increases slowly early, jumps up during mid-auction,
and levels off towards the end of the auction. The resulting closing price is analogous
to the carrying capacity L in the logistic growth function.
5.2.3.4 The Reflected-Logistic Model
Another common price process in online auctions is a reflected “S” shaped
curve. Such behavior can be captured by the inverse of logistic growth, or reflected-







In the online auction context, this type of growth occurs when there is some early
bidding that results in a price increase, followed by little to no bidding in the middle
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of the auction, and then another price increase as the auction approaches its close.
In particular, price spikes near the end may be caused by sniping.
5.2.3.5 The 4-member growth model family
The set of four growth models is used to approximate price paths as follows:
For a dataset of auctions, each of the four models is fitted to each auction. Then,
for each auction, the four estimated models are compared in terms of fit, and the
best fitting model is chosen (for more on the fitting process, see [45]). Hence, the
fitting process is a two-stage process.
Since the family is entirely parametric, no nuisance parameters require deter-
mination. Moreover, since the family is monotonic, it is well-suited for capturing
auction price processes. Moreover, the 4-member family of growth models is com-
putationally efficient compared to monotone splines, and ordinary least squares
functions can be used for estimation.
The main disadvantage of the four-model family is it is limited to only four
basic shapes – exponential, logarithmic, logistic, and reflected-logistic – which may
be overly simplistic for some auction scenarios. Moreover, because the four models
are not nested within a single model, comparing fit (for choosing the best model)
is nontrivial. Finally, when fitting the exponential and logistic models via least
squares, the models minimize error in the bid amount space. In contrast, when
fitting the two reflected models (logarithmic and reflected-logistic growth) using
least squares, the error minimization is done in the bid time space. A comparison
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is therefore more complicated.
5.2.4 Comparison
To illustrate the difference between penalized splines, monotone splines and
the 4-member family of growth models, consider Figure 5.1, which displays the fit
of the three methods to two sample auction price paths. The solid lines represent p-
splines, the dashed lines represent monotone splines, and the dotted lines represent
the best fit of the 4-member growth model family. We see that while p-splines can fit
the data very well, they are very variable and do not capture the monotonic nature
of the price path. While the 4-member growth family results in a monotonous price
path, it does not fit the data well. Monotone splines appear to provide the best
fit in this example; however, it takes on average almost 7 seconds to fit a single
monotone spline (compared to 0.02 seconds for one p-spline and and 0.04 seconds
for one 4-member growth model).
5.3 A New Model for Auction Price Paths: The Beta Model
In light of the shortcomings of existing models for online auction price paths
and dynamics, we introduce a single parametric model that is flexible yet parsimo-
nious for approximating price paths and their dynamics. We have briefly introduced
the model in Chapter 4 based on which Kullback-Leibler distance is used to measure
the distance between two auction price paths. We now discuss model estimation and
its properties in detail.
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of the three existing smoothing methods. The solid lines
represent p-splines, dashed lines are for monotone splines, and the dotted lines are
for growth models.
Our proposed model is based on the Beta cumulative distribution function
(CDF). The Beta distribution is a continuous probability distribution defined on
the interval [0, 1] with two shape parameters (α and β) that fully determine the
distribution. Its CDF can be written as






where B(α, β) is the beta function1, which serves as a normalization constant in the
CDF to ensure that F (1, α, β) = 1.
We use the Beta model to capture auction price paths in the following way.
Let p denote the sequence of observed bids with associated time-stamps t. Since






scale by using the transformation tn = t/Duration. tn are time-stamps between
0 and 1. Similarly, because auctions close at different prices, we normalize the
observed bids to a 0-1 scale by using the transformation pn = p/ClosingPrice. pn
are bid values between 0 and 1. The goal is then to find the values of α and β
that satisfy pn =
∫ tn
0
uα−1(1− u)β−1du/B(α, β) for every element of pn and tn. An
algorithm for achieving this goal efficiently is described in Section 5.3.1.
The Beta model is very flexible in the types of curves that it can produce. It
includes as special cases the four shapes of the 4-member growth model family of
[45]. The top panel in Figure 5.2 shows the Beta model curves for different values of
α and β. The solid line represents the case where price grows rapidly at the auction
beginning and at the end, but not in the middle, corresponding to logit growth.
The long-dashed line represents the situation where rapid growth only occurs at
the end, corresponding to exponential growth. The short-dashed line shows early
rapid growth, corresponding to logarithmic growth. And finally, the dotted-dashed
line captures a rapid increase in price somewhere in the middle of the auction,
corresponding to the reverse-logit growth pattern.
5.3.1 Fitting the Beta Model
Fitting the Beta model to bid data can be done in a way that results in curves
that fit well in two dimensions: bid time and bid amount. In the auction context
both dimensions are important. In particular, a good fit in terms of the bid timing
is necessary in order to accurately capture points of different bidding activities.
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Figure 5.2: Beta CDF (top panel) and corresponding PDF (bottom panel) with
different shape parameters (α, β)
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Periods of vastly different biding activity, e.g. early or last-minute bidding, have
been documented well in the auction literature (e.g. [86]), and they are important to
capture adequately. In terms of bid amounts, a model that adequately captures the
bid amounts (i.e., the price at that point of the auction), is necessary for generating
accurate forecasts of an auction’s final price. Auction price forecasting is of practical
interest and different forecasting models have been suggested in the literature [32;
33; 96; 57; 53; 21].
The only inputs required for fitting the Beta CDF are the observed bid amounts
and their associated time stamps. The resulting price path representation is char-
acterized by only two parameters. The simplicity and parsimony of the Beta model
distinguish it from alternative approaches. Our algorithm for fitting the Beta CDF
minimizes residuals in both bid amount and bid time dimensions simultaneously.
5.3.1.1 Beta-Fitting Algorithm
For a given auction, we estimate α and β from the observed bids as follows:
Step 1: Standardize bid amounts and bid times
Since the range (y) as well as the domain (x) of the Beta CDF is [0, 1], we first








x and y are now bid times and bid amounts standardized within [0, 1].
Step 2: Compute α0 and β0, the initial values of α̂ and β̂
Since we treat x as a Beta-distributed random variable, it is reasonable to
assume that the empirical average and variance of x are close to their theoret-
ical mean and variance. That is, mean(x) ' α
α+β
and var(x) ' αβ
(α+β)2(α+β+1)
.




(α∗, β∗)|DISTA(α∗, β∗) = min(DISTA(α, β))} ,











Step 3: Compute α̂ and β̂
In order to capture both the bid levels as well as the bid times, our model
minimizes error both in y and x directions simultaneously. Specifically, we
choose to minimize the sum of the squared residuals in y and x directions.
With the initial values α0 and β0 from Step 2, we solve for α̂ and β̂ through
the following minimization problem:
(α̂, β̂) =
{
(α∗, β∗)|DISTB(α∗, β∗) = min(DISTB(α, β))}
where DISTB(α, β) =
∑
(y − pbeta(x, α, β))2 + ∑(x − qbeta(y, α, β))2; and
pbeta and qbeta represent the cumulative distribution function and the inverse
of the cumulative distribution function of the beta distribution respectively.
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The above algorithm is computationally very efficient. It takes, on average,
0.0489 seconds to fit the Beta model to one auction (using the above algorithm),
which compares favorably to the 4-member growth family (0.0362 seconds). Unsur-
prisingly, penalized splines fare better (0.0190 seconds) since they do not encounter
any iterations. Conversely, fitting monotone splines, which do require iterative
passes through the data, result in 150 times larger computing times (on average
of 6.9726 seconds per auction).
5.3.2 Properties of the Beta Model
The Beta model shares the main properties of competing methods (p-splines,
monotone splines and the 4-family growth model), but it also has several additional
properties that set it apart. Like all competing methods, the derivatives of the
continuous Beta curves can be used to capture price dynamics. The Beta model
produces monotonically non-decreasing curves, yet it is computationally fast (using
the algorithm from Section 5.3.1). Unlike non-parametric approaches, fitting the
Beta model does not involve any nuisance parameters.
Like the 4-member parametric growth model, the two-parameter Beta model
can be used to characterize auction types (e.g. exponential, logarithmic, logistic or
reflected logistic) in terms of price dynamics.
The Beta model has two additional unique properties, which make it especially
advantageous in the online auction context: (1) Because both of its dimensions (bid
time and bind amount) are derived from a probability function, the Beta summary
128
statistics can be used to learn about the bid timing distribution, and (2) there is an
easy and straightforward way to measure pairwise distances between price paths.
The latter is especially useful in the context of pairwise comparisons and dynamic
forecasting as shown in Chapter 4. We discuss those model properties in detail next.
5.3.2.1 Representing Price Dynamics
The Beta CDF representation of the price paths means that price velocity,
which is the first derivative of the price curve, is given by the Beta probability
density function (PDF). In particular, at any given time T , the price velocity of an
auction with shape parameters α and β can be computed as:




where t is the normalized T on a scale of [0, 1] (t = T
duration
) and B(α, β) is the beta
function.
The bottom panel in Figure 5.2 plots the price velocities corresponding to the
price paths in the top panel. The solid black line shows rapid dynamics at the
beginning and end, but not much price activity during the middle; in contrast, the
dashed gray line signals heightened price dynamics during mid-auction. Similarly,
the solid gray line captures increased price-velocity towards the end while the dotted
dashed line captures early price spurts.
Higher order price dynamics can also be readily obtained by taking higher
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order derivatives. For example, price acceleration can be computed as






− β − 1
1− t
)
Price dynamics carry important information about the auction process [10].
Therefore accurate approximations of price dynamics are beneficial across multiple
applications. In section 5.4 we show that the price dynamics generated via the Beta
model lead to more accurate price forecasts compared to competing approaches.
5.3.2.2 Characterizing Growth Patterns
Similar to the 4-member growth family of [45], the Beta model provides a tool
for characterizing price process types. In fact, there is a one-to-one mapping between
the Beta model and the four growth models via the shape parameters α and β. For
example, if both α and β are smaller than 1, then the price curve is similar to the
reflected-logistic model. Table 5.1 lists the relationship between the Beta model and
the 4-member growth family. The implication of this relationship is that it allows
us to easily characterize auctions in terms of their type of price dynamics, without
the need of more specialized techniques such as functional clustering (e.g. [54]) or
via laborus visual examination (e.g. [44]).
5.3.2.3 Characterizing Bid Timing
The estimated Beta parameters α and β can be used to compute summary
statistics which capture bid timing information. Table 5.2 gives the formulas for the
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Table 5.1: Correspondence between the Beta model and the four growth models
Growth Models Beta Model
Exponential α = 1 β < 1
α > 1 β ≤ 1
Logarithmic α < 1 β ≥ 1
α = 1 β > 1
Logistic α > 1 β > 1
Reflected-logistic α < 1 β < 1
variance, mode, and skewness. The variance gives information about the dispersion
of the bid arrivals; the mode, which is the peak of the price velocity curve, tells us
about the time during the auction when the price moved fastest. Finally, skewness
measures the level of asymmetry in the bid timings. Online auctions tend to see
either high bidding activity at the start and/or at the end.




Dispersion of the bid arrivals
Mode α−1
α+β−2 The peak of the velocity curve;








Asymmetry of the bid arrivals.
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5.4 Empirical Comparison
In this section we compare the proposed Beta model with competing methods
for fitting auction price paths. In particular, we compare it to p-splines, monotone
splines and the 4-member growth model family. Comparisons are made on two
different dimensions: In terms of fit, we compare the different models’ ability to
generate accurate price representations of observed auction data; and in terms of
prediction, we compare the forecast accuracy of the four methods in predicting the
final price of a set of ongoing auctions. We will see that in the forecasting context, it
is especially important not only to have an adequate approximation of the auction’s
price path, but also of its price dynamics. The data we use is the Palm PDA data
set (Appendix A).
5.4.1 Model-fit Comparison
To evaluate goodness of fit of a model, we examine the residual error both
in terms of bid amount (y) and bid time (x), because it is important to accurately
capture not only the times when bids are placed but also the resulting price. For






[0.5(yk − ŷk)2 + 0.5(xk − x̂k)2],
where (xk, yk) and (x̂k, ŷk) are the observed and fitted values, respectively. Note
that since both p-splines and monotone splines only minimize errors in terms of bid
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amount (y), we set xk = x̂k, which may result in an overly optimistic view of these
two methods.
We apply all four methods to the Palm PDA auction data set. That is, for
each auction we estimate a p-spline, a monotone spline, the best of the 4-member
growth model family, and our Beta model. For each auction, we first normalize
the observed bids p and associated times t into a [0,1] scale via the transformations
pn = p/ClosingPrice and tn = t/Duration. We then fit each of the models2 to
the normalized data (tn, pn). Normalization results in an equal weighing of the
residuals in both bid time and bid amount dimensions, since they are measured on
equal scales. We repeat the process for all 380 auctions in our data set.
The distributions of the absolute residuals are shown in Figure 5.3. We can see
that the Beta model (top left panel) results in the second-best fit (average error =
0.0125), surpassed only slightly by the fit of monotone splines (bottom right panel;
average error = 0.0112). Both, p-splines and the 4-family growth models, result
in a much worse representation of the data (average error of 0.0326 and 0.0434,
respectively). But also recall the much longer estimation time for monotone splines:
it takes a total of 2,650 seconds (or 44 minutes) to fit the 380 auctions; this compares
to only 19 seconds for the Beta model!
2For p-splines and monotone splines, the smoothing parameters are determined using leave-
one-out cross-validation; for the 4-member growth family, we fit each of the 4 growth models via











































































Figure 5.3: Residuals for the four models: Beta model (top left), 4-member growth
models (top right), p-splines (bottom left) and monotone splines (bottom right).
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5.4.2 Forecasting Accuracy Comparison
We now compare the four methods in terms of their capability of producing
accurate forecasts of an auction’s final price. Information of the final price ahead of
time has advantages for all auction participants. Bidders can use this information
to make more informed bidding decisions (see Chapter 2 or [57]). Sellers can use
predictions to identify times when the market is more favorable to sell their products
(e.g., higher demand, lower supply). We pay particular attention to the role of price
dynamics: how different smoothing methods result in different dynamics and the
subsequent effect on predictions.
The following model incorporates the price path and price dynamics in a lin-
ear fashion for predicting the final price. Although one can use a wide range of
model-formulations, such as complicated regression models (see Chapter 2 and 3)
or tree models (Chapter 4), we choose the simple linear model for simplicity. Lin-
ear regression models have also been the main tool for investigating price in online
auctions. More formally, to forecast the final price at time T during the ongoing
auction, we use the model:




3V elocityT , (5.16)
where PriceT and V elocityT correspond to the price and its velocity (i.e. first
derivative) at time T , estimated using one of the four methods, and X includes
control variables that describe the seller, the product, and the auction features.
Such variables include the opening price, auction duration, shipping fee, seller’s
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feedback score, whether or not the auction features a picture, whether the seller
is an eBay store, whether the seller is a powerseller, and the number of bids, and
average bidders rating (measured at time T ). The inclusion of the control variables
accounts for wide variability in price that results from different product features,
seller credentials, and auction setting. Since this information is observable, we
include it in our forecasting model.
Our goal is to compare the impact of different methods for approximating
price and price dynamics (i.e. PriceT and V elocityT ) on the forecast accuracy. We
therefore estimate model (5.16) four times, each time only exchanging the price path
estimation method, but leaving everything else the same3.
To compare the forecasting performance, we use a holdout set. In particular,
we split the auctions into a training and a holdout set, each consisting of 50% of
the auctions. Model parameters are estimated using the training set, and then
predictive accuracy is measured by the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE)






where yi and ŷi denote the true and estimated final price in auction i, respectively.
We also study the robustness of our results to different forecasting windows by
changing T .
Figure 5.4 shows the results. We see that the Beta model and monotone splines
produce the most accurate forecasts. Their accuracy also improves fastest as the
time horizon shortens (i.e. as T becomes smaller and smaller, closer to the auction-
3Recall that the Beta model operates on normalized bid times and amounts. Thus, in order to
estimate PriceT and V elocityT , we first normalize the bid amounts and bid timings to [0, 1] scale,
fit the Beta model, and then obtain the predictions via reverse-transformation.
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end). While both the Beta model and monotone splines produce forecasts of similar
quality, recall the extra computational burden necessary for monotone splines (44
minutes vs. 19 seconds).
Both p-splines and the 4-member growth model family result in poorer fore-
casting performance. One explanation is that both methods result in poorer model-
fit (as outlined in Section 5.4.1), and as a consequence, the predictors for the fore-























Figure 5.4: Comparison of forecasting accuracy for different time horizons.
5.5 Conclusion
We have introduced a two-parameter model for approximating price paths in
online auctions. The Beta model combines the strengths of p-splines or monotone
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splines models, such as monotonicity and computational efficiency, with additional
properties that make it especially useful in the online auction context. It adequately
captures the price path and its dynamics and measures pairwise distances between
price paths or price dynamics curves in a straightforward manner as shown in Chap-
ter 4. Moreover, the Beta model can be used to characterize auctions in terms of
price growth and to summarize the bid timing distribution.
The Beta model is parsimonious, yet very flexible for capturing a wide range
of price paths. It is computationally cheap to estimate, and provides good fit both
in terms of the bid amount and the bid timing. Our empirical comparison with
competing models shows the advantages of the Beta models for model fitting as well
as for accurately forecasting the final price of ongoing auctions.
The Beta model can be used for several practical purposes. We have discussed
and illustrated the power of the Beta model for forecasting ongoing auctions. We
show in Chapter 2 that accurate and efficient forecasting models can be used for
making automated bidding decisions. The Beta model has the potential to increase
the accuracy of forecasting models significantly due to its ability to measure sim-
ilarity between price paths. For instance, Chapter 4 show that using similarities
between auction price paths can lead to much improved forecasts using a K-nearest
neighbor context. But the Beta model can also lead to innovations beyond forecast-
ing. [21] provide evidence that price dynamics can proxy for competition between
bidders across auctions. We are curious to learn about additional applications of
the Beta model in the near future.
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Chapter 6
Pricing and Sales Person Decision Making: An Exploratory Analysis
6.1 Introduction
As the rapid development in company which accompanies increasing produc-
tion size and customer population, setting an appropriate price which guarantees
customer satisfaction yet yields acceptable profit margin has been a difficult task
for many business. AMR Research (2004) stated that improved pricing can yield
20%-35% reduction in waste or unused inventory, 2%-4% increase in corporate rev-
enues, and 1%-3% increase in profit. Data mining tools are been employed in this
offline business setting for help understand business problems and make informed
decisions. One example is the employment of decision support tools (DST).
Retail chains (such as apparel retailers The Gap), airlines and hotels often face
an extremely difficult task when selecting prices for hundreds of products/services
over hundreds of stores nationally and/or internationally. In such complex Business-
to-Consumer (B2C) pricing environments, DSTs have proven themselves to be ex-
tremely valuable in aiding firms and improving their profits. For instance, Marriott
International Hotels uses information technology (IT) and DSTs in demand fore-
casting and scientific pricing optimization to determine the price of every bed in
each of their properties; [76] mentions Marriott’s annual profit increase for individ-
ual hotels totaled $86 million after the rollout of their in-house developed pricing
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and revenue management system in 2004.
The computation power used to collect vast amounts of data and run in real
time large statistical analysis and optimization routines is all being done to help
uncover the holy grail of pricing: a customer’s maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP).
Customer WTP is often endogenously determined - part of the process of deter-
mining it relies on observable traits (e.g., price of comparable products, customer’s
purchase history including past transaction prices and purchase quantities, market
indicators such as seasonal effects), which can be captured and modeled in a de-
cision tool. Other parts of the WTP formation process depends on unobservable
traits that speak to how a customer perceives/ internalizes a price quote and reacts
to it (e.g., concepts of fairness, [65], anchoring and adjustment, [64], framing of the
price quote, [94]). While both observable and unobservable factors may exist and
hence be useful in determining customer WTP in B2C markets, the relatively small
dollar spend of each customer coupled with the large number of customers present
in the market generally imply that firms can ignore the unobservable traits and still
make reasonable pricing decisions that are implementable. The same cannot be said
for B2B markets; and it is on these markets that our research is focused.
Pricing in B2B settings typically is done by sales people (henceforth ‘salesreps’),
who are in charge of managing the (relatively) large accounts of and relations with
several business customers. Hence, in contrast to B2C settings, the typical B2B pric-
ing environment relies more heavily on personal relations and human interactions,
whereby the salesrep is entrusted with determining the impact of the unobservable
customer traits on the customer’s WTP. To emphasize the human involvement, we
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hereby refer to B2B settings by H2H (Human-to-Human) hereafter. For example,
the salesrep must assess if a customer will find a price to be fair (whether or not it is
a price that is justified by current market conditions), how and on what the customer
anchors his willingness to pay (e.g., the past price paid or possibly a competitor’s
current price), the strength of the relationship between salesrep and customer and
hence whether a customer will trust a quoted price as being reasonable, how cus-
tomer reacts to price increases, etc. These intangible pieces of information are only
known to the salesrep and as such are very hard to incorporate into a DST. Thus,
while a DST can gather information across hundreds of sales people, products and
markets, and is able to make better aggregate predictions about demand, an expe-
rienced sales person may have a better “sense” for individual customers and hence
may rightfully reject DST price recommendations as inappropriate for a particular
customer.
If we were able to view salesreps rejection of/deviation from price recommen-
dations as only improving our knowledge of customer WTP, it is possible to adjust
the demand forecast and pricing algorithms in DSTs to properly incorporate the
salesrep’s better informed action. However, it is well documented that being an
“expert” does not always imply better decisions [93]. Salesreps themselves are hu-
man, and hence are subject to their own decision biases and judgment heuristics
(e.g., memory bias, [93], satisficing behavior, [77], status quo bias, [66]). A salesreps
tacit knowledge of the customer (demand), coupled with his own decision heuristics
can be significantly different than those that of a scientific price formation process.
As a consequence, it is not clear whether pricing recommendations to salesreps in
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H2H markets as they have in B2C e-commerce.
Academic literature on pricing features surprisingly little research on H2H
pricing, and even less so on behavior of sales people in this context. While there
is a large literature on pricing in economics, marketing, or operations management
for B2C markets [94; 20; 101], the human element as a final decision maker and its
influence on future customer demand is often neglected. We set out to study what
salesreps are considering when determining sales price with a particular customer
in this lack of study. In particular, we are curious if salesreps will incorporate a
price recommendation when it is presented to them; in other words, are these price
recommendations having an impact?
Consider a sales person in charge of selling a single product to a specific cus-
tomer. The pricing process of the sales person can be expressed as a “mental model”,
by which we mean the entire thought process that the sales person uses to arrive
at the price decision. This thought process may be driven in part by factual data
such as the unit cost of the product at the time of transaction, the the price recom-
mended to the sales person for this customer. The thought process, and thus the
mental model, may also involve other factors, some observable and some unobserv-
able, such as customer’s purchase history, a sales person’s attitude towards risk in
closing a deal (vs. losing the sales), information obtained from the customer during
a sales transaction, a target sales quota self-selected by the sales person, tendency
of the customer to negotiate, and so on. We aim at identifying important factors
that determine a sales person’s price and thus salesreps’ mental decision model in
a H2H setting. This study helps us understand the pricing process, in general, and
142
outcome of a sales transaction, in particular.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we introduce the data
used in this study and discuss the necessity of data reduction procedure prior to
the analysis. In Section 6.3, we discuss factors that are potentially important for
salesreps’ mental models and select the mental model that best mimics salesrep’
price decisions. We emphasize the significance of the recommendation from DST in




The data used in this study is the authentic transaction records of one of
the leading grocery product distributors during a 20 month period (January 2007 to
August 2008). Each transaction record contains information about the involved sales
division ID, salesrep, customer, and product ID, product category, commodity flag,
quantity ordered, invoice date, cost, transacted price, and for many transactions,
the recommended price. We explain each piece of information in detail.
The grocery product distributor consists of 17 sales (geographic) divisions
across the country. Each division is assigned a unique sales division ID, has its own
bonus system and provides training to salesreps regarding making price decisions
and using DST.
Within each division, each salerep is assigned a unique salesrep ID. Salesreps
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have direct interactions (e.g. phone calls or personal visits) with customers (e.g.
hotels, restaurants, etc.) each of whom is assigned a unique customer ID, responding
to inquiries for certain products and making final price decision for each transaction.
All salesreps and customers are referred to by IDs; no personal information about
them is available to us.
Each transaction record includes a product ID, the category and commodity
flag for the transacted product, and the quantity ordered. Customers may order
several products during one interaction with salesreps, each of which will generate a
separate transaction record in the data set. Product category is a higher hierarchy
of products, examples for some product categories include fruit or frozen cheese.
Commodity flag is a binary flag used in the system to distinguish perishable products
(commodity) from non-perishable products (non-commodity).
We also know the unit cost and transacted price for each transaction. Cost
is the unit production cost for each product plus a certain margin. The transacted
price determined by the salesrep is and should always be at least as high as the cost,
which guarantees a positive profit margin.
The information above is available for all transactions. In addition, for some
transactions (approximately 50% of all transactions in the data set), price recom-
mendation is available to the salesreps and recorded in the data set. This recom-
mendation is generated by DST as the result of a complicated dynamic optimization
process and made specifically for the salesrep-customer-product triplet (hereafter re-
ferred to as triplet) under the specific market condition. Every weekend, DST makes
price recommendations for triplets who are expected to experience new transactions
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in the following week. Transactions occurred in the following week involving those
triplets are then provided with such price recommendation; yet salesreps can ig-
nore/overwrite the recommendation. For all other transactions, price recommenda-
tion is absent.
6.2.2 Data Reduction
Not all the transactions in the data set contribute to our analysis. For reasons
explained below, we perform significant data reduction procedure and focus our
analysis on the remaining part.
In the complete data set, each triplet has made 25 transactions in average
in the 18 months period. Nevertheless, the number varies greatly across triplets,
ranging from 1 to 446. For triplets with too few transactions, a mature mental
model might have not been established in the salesrep’s mind. Due to this concern,
we only keep triplets with more than 10 transactions in the analysis.
The remaining transactions involves 132 product categories which generate
total profits of $20,107,234. Based on ABC analysis [95], we find that the top 88
product categories take up 99% of the total profit as well as 99% of the transactions.
To focus on profitable products, we exclude transactions for the other 44 categeries
from the analysis.
The goal of our study is to understand the salesreps’ mental model for making
price decisions. The mental model is influenced by the magnitude of cost change.
Previous studies [72] show that in case of small or no change in the cost, little
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price adjustment should be made. This conclusion is also supported by our data.
We find that salesreps usually make no price adjustment when the cost change is
between -2% and 3%1in two consecutive transactions for a customer regarding a
certain product. In other words, salesreps’ mental model is simple in case of small
or no cost change; that is Price = the Last Transacted Price. On the contrary,
when the cost change is outside the range of [-2%, 3%], salesreps tend to make price
adjustments in response. In this study, we focus on salesreps’ mental model when
facing cost changes in non-negligible scale, and thus exclude transactions with cost
change between -2% and 3% from the analysis.
Finally, we exclude the first two transactions for each triplet from the analy-
sis. The first two transactions for each triplet correspond to transactions with new
customers or existing customers but new products for which salesreps may have dif-
ferent mental models in order to win the business [18]. Excluding these transactions
removes the impact of the complication.
As a result of the data reduction procedure, we end up with 962,650 trans-
actions which includes 1,167 salesreps, 13,863 customers, 36,538 products from 88
product categories. We further divide the data set into two: one consists of transac-
tions with recommended price, and the other one consists of those without. The first
data set takes up 41.34% transactions and includes 180,244 triplets while 123,065
triplets are there in the other data set. We make use of the first data set to investi-
gate how sales people make pricing decisions in existence of price recommendation in
H2H business (Section 6.3). And we use the second data set for comparison analysis
1This means the cost increase is less than 2% or the cost decrease is less than 3%.
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based on which we try to understand how salesreps make price decisions differently
with and without price recommendation (Section 6.4). Details about the two data
sets can be found in Table A.3 in Appendix A.
6.3 Mining Mental Models
6.3.1 Building Mental Models
We aim at identifying important factors that determine salesreps’ price, i.e.
their mental models. In other words, our research questions is: what factors might
influence the current price Pt a salesrep offers given that the last price he charged
(to the same customer and product) was Pt−1. As we can see, our basic research
object is each triplet .
As there is no existing research on the topic, we use a combination of eco-
nomic theory (to develop candidate variables) and data mining (to elicit the most
reasonable model). Salesreps’ decisions on price decisions are influenced by many
conceptually important factors, some observable to us from the data and some not.
For example, we observe whether the cost of the product has changed; how frequently
a customer has purchased the product from a salesrep; and what is the total value
of the goods the customer is buying. At the same time, there are unobservable
factors (unobservable from the data available to us) such as how the customer has
reacted to price increases; or whether the salesreps trust the recommended price. In
the following, we create a variety of features to account for these observable factors
and then build a sequence of regression models that digs deeper and deeper into the
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sales persons mind. In particular, we build a sequence of mental models to explain
the observed price adjustment salesreps make in two consecutive transactions, i.e.
Pt−Pt−1, for a triplet by adding in potential predictors sequentially. The change in
models’ explanatory and prediction capability reflects the importance of associated
predictor to the mental model.
The first predictor for our mental model is the cost change in two consecutive
transactions for the triplet. Economic theories state that cost change is the funda-
mental drive for and explains most part of price change. We use this model as the
baseline model, referred as model (1).
Model (2) includes commodityflag in addition to cost change. This predictor
takes the value of 1 for commodity and 0 for non-commodity. Commodities are
perishable products, for which Salesreps are expected to make appropriate price
adjustments for timely sells. For instance, they might keep price stable in case of
cost increases to make a sell.
Salesreps behave differently for upwards or downwards cost change. Salesreps
are motivated to charge high prices (or margins) since the revenue (or profit) they
generated has an impact on their salary (or bonus). We are informed by some
salesreps that smaller price decrease is usually made for a certain level of cost de-
creases while larger price increase is often associated with the cost increases of the
same amount. Model (3) in the sequence therefore includes the predictor - the sign
of cost change which takes the value of 1 in case of cost increase and 0 otherwise -
in addition to predictors in (2).
Besides the sign of cost change, size of cost change can also have an impact on
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salesreps’ price decisions. Salesreps might not make price adjustments when facing
a 5% cost increase, but they are much more likely to respond to a cost increase of
50%. From our data, we find 10% is an appropriate cutoff for cost change, above
which (in either direction) salesreps have great chance to make corresponding price
adjustments. We therefore refer to cost increase or decrease bigger than 10% as
big cost change, and cost change less than that as medium cost change. Note
that Transactions with cost changes that are between -2% and 3% have already
been excluded in the data reduction step. The size of cost change is the additional
predictor for model (4).
Salesreps should look beyond the two consecutive transactions when making
price decisions. If the cost has been rising continuously and the salesreps have made
price increase accordingly, customers might be scared away in fear of future higher
prices. Experienced salesrep therefore are expected to take this into consideration.
We define cost trend to be the existing of cost change in the same direction in two
consecutive periods (three consecutive transactions) for a triple. For example, if the
cost goes down continuously in three consecutive transactions for a triplet, the last
two transactions are on a downward cost trend. Model (5) includes cost trend which
takes the value of 1 if there exists cost trend in either direction and 0 otherwise as
an additional predictor to capture the effect.
Salesreps might consider giving a long time customer lower price to compen-
sate his/her loyalty or higher price since they’re not as afraid of losing him as for
new customers. We use repeated purchase for a triplet, which is measured by the
cumulative number of transaction, to capture the length of relationship, and include
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it as a predictor in model (6).
Besides loyal customers, incentives are possibly also offered to bundles of large
value. By bundles, we mean the transactions that occur during one interaction
(phone call or personal visits) between a salesrep and a customer. Since transac-
tions for different products are recorded separately even if the customers ordered
them altogether, it makes sense to treat them as a bundle whose total value or
quantities might influence salesrep’s price decision. To capture this effect, we in-
clude total dollar value (in log scale) of the bundle that each transaction belongs to
as a predictor in model (7).
We have proposed a sequence of 7 models. Each model include one additional
predictor comparing to the previous model. Moreover, in each model, we include
all one-way interaction among its predictors. The inclusion of the interaction terms
helps capture the interplay of two factors.
6.3.1.1 Effect of Price Recommendation
Besides influential factors discussed above, price recommendations are also
available to salesreps for transactions in our first data set (see Section 6.2 for de-
tailed explanation). On one hand, as the output from DST which gathers infor-
mation across hundreds of sales people, price recommendation is a theoretically
optimized price. On the other hand, however, experienced salesreps possibly have a
better “sense” for individual customers and hence may rightfully reject price recom-
mendations from DST and make more appropriately personalized price decisions.
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Therefore, it is not very clear if salesreps will and should incorporate a price rec-
ommendation when it is presented to them; and if the recommendations do have an
impact, how big it is.
Because price recommendation is available in this data set, we can investigate
the impact of price recommendation on salesreps’ mental models in the following
way. We define recommended price adjustments to be the difference between the
current price recommendation and the last transacted price, i.e. Recomt − Pt−1.
For each model we propose, we build a paired model which includes, in addition
to previous predictors, the recommended price adjustment as well as one way in-
teraction between it and all other predictors. Then we compare each model to its
counterpart. This comparison answers the questions that whether the recommended
price adjustment has an impact on salesreps’ mental models and if so, how much
the impact is. We refer to the model without recommendations as model 1(a)-7(a),
and their counterparts as model 1(b)-7(b).
So far, we have build 14 models (7 pairs). We summarize the models in Table
6.12 . To find the true mental models of salesreps and the factors that salesreps truly
anchor on, we compare models’ explanatory (explaining the observed behaviors of
salesreps’ price adjustments) and prediction (predicting price adjustments for future
transactions) capability. We discuss model comparison and selection in detail in the
next subsection.
2We have also investigated models by adding in predictors in different orders, all of the alter-
native analysis gives identical conclusion as our current analysis.
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3 + sign of cost change
4 + size of cost change (a) + recommended price adjustment
5 + cost trend
6 + repeated purchase
7 + values of bundle
6.3.2 Model Selection
In order to identify factors that are included in salesreps’ mental model, we
compare above models in terms of their explanatory and predictive capability. High
R2 and low Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values infer that the model fits
the data well and predictors in the model well explains observed price changes.
However, good model-fit can possibly be the result of overfitting which weakens
the generalizability of the model onto new data. Therefore, we also study models’
capability of predicting salesreps’ price adjustments on “future” transactions.
To that end, we divide our data set into a training set (70% of the transac-
tions), and a holdout set (remaining 30% of the transactions). we first estimate our
models on the training set using ordinary least square method; results of model-fit
measured by R2 and BIC are discussed below. We then apply the estimated mod-
els to the holdout set to gauge their predictive capabilities measured by RMSE
which is defined as RMSE =:
√
avg(|PCi − P̂Ci|2) where PCi and P̂Ci repre-
sent observed and predicted price adjustment for the ith transaction respectively.
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A model’s RMSE value measures the average difference in dollars between the
predicted and observed price adjustment. Moreover, the changes in R2, BIC and
RMSE between any pair of models measure the additional explanatory and pre-
diction power brought by the inclusion of recommended price adjustments on the
salesreps’ mental models when the recommendation is given.
6.3.2.1 Model Fit Comparison
We compare the explanatory capability in terms of R2 and BIC on the training
set. The top panel in Figure 6.1 plots the R2 for all models and the bottom panel
plots model BICs. The blue lines represent models without price recommendation,
i.e. model 1(a)-7(a); and the red lines represent model with recommended price
adjustments, i.e. model 1(b)-7(b).
We can see that the predictor cost change itself explains 77.5% of salesreps’
price adjustments, which justifies our intuition that cost change is the most funda-
mental factor influencing the mental model. Moreover, as more predictors added
into the model, the value of R2 increases and BIC goes down in either blue or red
line, both indicate a better model-fit. R2 increases and BIC decreases at a steady
speed as we add in commodityflag, sign and size of cost change sequentially, imply-
ing the first four predictors matter. After that, any additional predictor (cost trend,
repeated purchase, and values of bundle) has only marginal effect on the model-fit.
We also see that the red line lies above the blue lines for any model in sequence,
which clearly indicates that recommended price adjustment is a valuable predictor
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for the mental model.
6.3.2.2 Prediction Capability Comparison
In addition to models’ explanatory capability, we also compare models’ capa-
bility to predict salesrep’s price adjustments on the holdout set. We can see from
Figure 6.2 that model 4 which includes cost change, commodityflag, sign and size of
cost change can best predict salesreps’ price decisions. The increasing in prediction
accuracy brought by other predictors is negligible.
Comparing the red with the blue lines, we also see that the inclusion of recom-
mended price adjustments makes us 8 cents (from $1.65 to $1.57 in model 4) closer
to the observed price adjustments. This implies that the salesreps are taking into
consideration of the price recommendation when it is presented to them.
6.3.3 Model Interpretation
From the discussion above, we can see that model 4(b) from Table 6.1 has the
best explanatory and predictive capability, thus best mimics salereps’ mental model.
Moreover, DST price recommendation has an impact on salesreps’ price decisions
when presented to them. Specifically, our analysis indicates that:
• Cost change is the most important determinant of price adjustments.
• Sales people behave differently when making price adjustments for different prod-
uct types (commodities vs. non-commodities, which correspond to items with very
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Figure 6.1: Comparison of R2 and BIC. The blue line represents model 1(a)-7(a)






















CC ComFlag Sign Size Trend T $Bundle
Figure 6.2: Comparison of RMSE. The blue line represents model 1(a)-7(a) and the
red line represents model 1(b)-7(b).
• Salesreps’ price adjustments are different facing cost increases from facing cost
decreases. Furthermore, they also differ for cost change in different sizes (big vs.
medium).
• In the presence of cost changes and commodity flag, the impacts of repeat pur-
chases, markets trends in cost, and the value of the purchase bundle are very small.
• Salesreps anchor on price recommendations from DST. Incorporating recom-
mended price adjustments into models helps explaining observed salesreps’ price
decision and predicting future prices. In particular, when present, recommended
price adjustment helps us better predict future price adjustments in the amount of
8 cents per transaction.
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6.4 Effects of Existence of Price Recommendation
Every weekend, DST updates the price recommendation for triplets that are
expected to experience new transactions in the following week. For other triplets,
the price recommendation is left blank.
From our analysis in the last section, we can see that salesreps anchor on rec-
ommended price adjustments if presented when they make price decisions. However,
the fact that price recommendations have an impact on salesreps’ mental models
does not necessarily imply the existence of price recommendation leads to better
price decision. The reason is as follows. No matter how experienced salesreps are,
they are all human beings who are subject to cognitive bias3.It has been found that
people’s decision or judgement is generally affected by irrelevant information [40].
Consequently, it is possible that price recommendation is irrelevant information for
making appropriate price decisions, and salesreps mistakenly takes that into consid-
eration.
To investigate whether or not price recommendation leads to better mental
models, we conduct the following comparison study. First, we study salesreps’ men-
tal model for the setting where price recommendation is absent. Then we compare
the results with settings where price recommendation exists.
We have two data sets. The first one consists of transactions with price recom-
mendation and has been used for previous analysis. The second data set includes
transactions without price recommendation (see Section 6.2 for detailed explana-
3A cognitive bias is a person’s tendency to make errors in judgment based on cognitive factors.
157
tion). The two data sets take up 41.33% and 58.67% of combined transactions
respectively, whose sizes are somewhat comparable. Moreover, there are 88,441
common triplets in the two data sets, which are 50% and 72% of all triplets in
them respectively. The large portion of common triplets guarantees the fairness of
our comparison. Any difference in the results should not be caused by the intrinsic
difference in the objects involved in the transactions but due to heterogeneity in
salesreps’ mental models.
For transactions in the second data set, salesreps make price decisions in ab-
sence of DST price recommendation. We feed the data into model 1(a)-7(a) from
Table 6.1, and compare models’ R2 and RMSE to find the best model, i.e. salesreps’
mental model, in this setting. The green line in Figure 6.3 plots R2 (top panel) and
RMSE (bottom panel) for the seven models. We can clearly see that model 4(a)
is the best model in terms of both model’s explanatory and predictive capability.
Remember we have found previously that salesreps’ mental model given price rec-
ommendation is model 4(b). Therefore, we claim that the existence of the price
recommendation does not change salesreps’ mental model but adding in one addi-
tional anchoring factor which is recommended price adjustments. In other words,
except for price recommendation, salesreps anchor on the same factors when mak-
ing price decision no matter whether DST provides them with recommended price
information or not. The other important factors that salesreps anchor on are cost
change, commodityflag, sign and size of cost change.
To make a clear comparison, we plot R2 and RMSE for model 1(b)-7(b) for
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Figure 6.3: Model comparison for transactions with or without price recommenda-
tion. The red line plots model 1(b)-7(b), and represents transactions from the first
data set which includes price recommendation information. The green line plots
model 1(a)-7(a), and represents transactions from the second data set where price
recommendation is not given.
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red lines on the same graph. Compare R2 (top panel) and RMSE (bottom panel)
for the red line with that for the green line, we can see that the inclusion of the
price recommendation improves both model-fit/explanatory and predictive capabil-
ity. The R2 for model 4 in the red line is slightly higher (0.007) than that in the
green line; and our prediction for salesreps’ price adjustments are on average $0.45
($2− $1.55 for model 4) closer to the truth in the red line which corresponds to the
case with DST price recommendation. The higher RMSE in the green line implies
that it is more difficult to describe how Salesreps make decisions in the absence of
price recommendation. This is because the existence of recommended price tunes
down the roles played by unobservable factors in salesreps’ decision making process.
In the absence of recommendation, unobservable factors, such as customers’ reac-
tion to price increase or competitors’ price adjustments, weigh more heavily in their
price decision process.
6.5 Conclusions
Different from B2C settings where DST has been adopted and proven to be ex-
tremely valuable in aiding firms and improving their profits, pricing in H2H settings
relies more heavily on personal relations and human interactions. In such settings,
salesreps are entrusted with taking charge of managing the large accounts of and
relations with business customers and making final price decisions. Although DST
has been adopted to provide price recommendations in such setting in practice by
a small number of companies, it is not very clear whether salesreps are under the
160
influence of such recommendation and if so, whether it helps salesreps make better
price decisions.
Salesreps are influenced by many conceptually different factors when making
price decisions, some observable and some not. In this study, we build a sequence
of mental models that dig deeper and deeper into salesreps’ mind, and use model
selection procedure to identify key (observable) factors that influence their pricing
decisions. We find that salesreps anchor on cost change, commodity flag, sign and
size of cost change, and price recommendation if presented, when making price
decisions. We also find that price recommendation weakens the influence played by
unobservable factors. Without recommendation, salesreps are influenced more by
unobservable factors, which makes their price decisions more difficult to explain and





In the following sections, we describe future research directions for the studies
presented in this dissertation.
7.1 Data Driven Bidding Strategy
In Chapter 2, we propose an automated and data-driven bidding strategy
that provides bidders with complete decision guides. Our current approach only
consider auctions that close within the given prediction window [T ,(T + 1)], and
we only predict the final price of auctions that end within that interval. To relax
the restriction, one can roll the model one additional time period forward to make
predictions at T + 2, based on the predicted values at T + 1; so that bidding on
auctions that close later is allowed. However, predictions two time periods into the
future (i.e. T → T + 2) are more uncertain than predictions only one step forward
(i.e. T → T + 1). It is not quite clear how to discount the additional prediction
uncertainty in our decision framework.
We consider only single unit auctions in this research, one could expand the
scope of our bidding strategy to multi unit auctions. Let us assume that a seller sells
n items (of identical product specification and quality) in the same auction; then
the bidders with the top n bids each win one item. In order to apply our bidding
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strategy to this scenario, bidders need to know the lowest transacting bid; that is,
they need to predict the price at which the nth item sells. Given a set of relevant
bidding records, one solution would be to apply our model to the price of the nth
item; that is, we would train our model to predict the lowest transacting bid.
A related issue is the purchasing of more than one unit at a time. If a bidder
has demand for more than one unit, then the current bidding strategy could still be
employed if the the bidder has no time constraints and decides to bid sequentially
and if the bidder’s WTP is the same for all units (assuming that there is unlimited
supply which is realistic for many of the items sold on eBay). However, if the
bidder needs to purchase n units within a short period of time and places m bids
simultaneously, then each bid should be discounted relative to the size of m; on the
other hand, bids may be inflated with decreasing time periods to assure that all
units are available on time. This calculation may change further for varying WTP
distributions. All-in-all, there are many opportunities for future research and we
hope to inspire some of it with this study.
7.2 Model Selection for Improved Forecasting
For bidders, making informed bidding decision requires forecasting models that
works well across an entire range of time-increments. In Chapter 2, we investigate
model selection criteria to find such a forecasting model. We make use of various
summary statistics of conventional model selection criteria, AIC and BIC, over
a time window to select models, and comparing models’ prediction capability of
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models selected under different criteria.
Our study is conducted in the context of online auctions, which are charac-
terized by events that arrive at very irregularly-spaced time intervals: since sellers
determine the end of an auction, bidders have to make decisions about events that
are sometimes very dense (i.e. several auctions closing within only seconds of each
other) and other times very sparse (e.g. at night when only very few auctions close).
It is this irregular spacing that calls for forecasting models that perform well in the
short-term as well as in the long-run; in fact, as we have pointed out, it calls for
models that perform well over a continuous distribution of time-increments.
While we derive the market-model within the context of eBay auctions, there
are other examples where similar models are called for. In fact, similar models could
be useful for markets that have similar characteristics (i.e. competition between
individual market occurrences that are unevenly spaced and that exhibit different
dynamics). Examples include other C2C auctions (e.g. uBid, Prosper, Overstock),
auctions for fine art [82], B2B auctions such as govdeals.com or liquidation.com.
Similar characteristics can also be found on traditional stock markets (in particular,
derivatives markets) or virtual markets (e.g. [90]), and Yahoo! Movies or CNET.com
where user ratings or blog postings are often marked by time periods of little activity,
followed by times of very dense information arrival. It would be interesting to
compare the performance of different model selection criteria, and to see whether
our conclusion, which states that the extreme of AIC or BIC selects the best model,
holds for those settings.
We can also extend our study to model selection criteria other than AIC and
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BIC. Traditional statistical theories have developed many model selection criteria,
such as R2, Mallows’ Cp, and Deviance information criterion. A more complete
investigation over those criteria may help find better forecasting models. Besides the
list of model selection criteria, an extension can also be made to ways of summarizing
those criteria over an interval. In this study, we summarize via summary statistics
including mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. One can
also use other statistics, such as quartiles or interquartile range, to summarize the
distribution of criteria over a given interval.
7.3 Weighted Forecasting of Closing Prices
Chapter 4 proposes a novel functional KNN forecaster for forecasting the final
price of an ongoing online auction. To accomplish this, we first introduce a functional
representation of the auction’s price path which allows measuring distances between
two paths via KL distance. Then, we define different distance metrics for other data-
types and combine them and KL distance into a single distance metric. Finally, we
apply K-Nearest Neighbor algorithm with carefully selected distance metric and
number of neighbors for making forecasts. There are many ways to expand upon
this area of research.
One extension is to search for alternative ways of defining distance metrics.
Currently, we scale distance metrics for different information sources to achieve
equal weighing across all metrics, one could alternatively assign individual weights
to individual metrics and then optimize the weights; Or we can construct the overall
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distance metric by applying principle component analysis to all individual distance
metrics. There are also alternative ways to define distances for different data types.
For example, for categorical data we can define several levels of category “similarity”,
such as “US brand”. Then, the distance between items can be set to 0.5 for “similar
categories” (e.g., laptops of a US brand) or 1 for categories that are more different.
We can also investigate alternate ways for making weighted forecasts. One
possibility is to expand upon classical linear regression and regression trees, i.e. to
develop weighted regression or weighted tree models, which might lead to forecasting
advantages especially for heterogeneous data. This extension, however, requires
defining weights for each sample, thus should be combined with the other extensions
suggested above.
7.4 A Flexible Model for Price Dynamics in Online Auctions
Section 5 explores various properties of a parsimonious parametric Beta model
as a representation of auction price paths. We develop an algorithm to estimate the
model by minimizing residual errors in both bid time and bid amount dimensions
simultaneously. In our current definition of a residual, we weigh the x and y direc-
tions equally (the weight is 0.5) because we have no particular reason to prioritize
either direction. Alternatively, one could overweigh the x or y direction if the bid-
ding time or price level, correspondingly, is of special interest. Comparing price
paths resulting from different weights in residuals can help gain insights about roles
played by bidding time and bidding amounts in determining price paths.
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While we show that the beta model has overall better model-fit compared
to p-splines, monotone splines, and 4-member growth models, the others might be
better for individual auction. One future research direction could be to investigate
which kind of auctions can be best described by which model. One possible way to
get this done is to run all models for every auction, categorize them based on the
model that fits them the best, find the common characteristics of auctions in each
group, and link that to the properties of corresponding model.
7.5 Pricing and Sales Person Decision Making
Pricing in B2B settings is typically done by salesreps, thus we refer to such
setting by H2H. Salesreps rely on their expertise, knowledge of individual customers,
many observable and non-observable information, and possibly price recommenda-
tions from DST, to make price quotes. In Chapter 6, we investigate factors in-
fluential to salesreps’ price formation process with special attention to the impact
of DST price recommendations. We find that cost related information, including
cost, sign and size of cost change, and types of products (perish commodities or
non-commodities), are the most important predictors for salesresps’ price decision.
Moreover, price recommendation, whenever provided, influence salesreps’ decisions
in a positive way.
There are many unanswered question, thus research opportunities, for H2H
pricing. In a H2H setting, sales people are the ones that interact with the customers
and quote them prices. By providing a first look into how salesreps form prices and
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respond to price recommendations in H2H markets, we do not only show the value
of DST, but also open the door to research about designers of DSTs. For instance,
one may turn to questions of how we can incorporate our findings into design of
DSTs and pricing processes to counter salesrep biases (similar to as is done in [31]).
Another extension to this study is to study the heterogeneity of the salesreps.
Our results in this study apply to the general case, or an average salesrep; and we
should expect very different price formation process for different salesreps. One way
to investigate salesreps’ heterogeneity is to repeat the analysis on a subset of data
which only includes a certain type of salesreps. For example, we can investigate
the mental model of salesreps in some sales division. Because each sales division
provides its own training regarding DST and has its own bonus system, we expect
to see that salesreps’ attitudes towards DST price recommendation and anchoring
factors are different across divisions.
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Appendix A
Data Sets Used in the Study
A.1 eBay Bids Level Data
A.1.1 Palm Pilot M515 PDA data
This dataset includes the complete bidding records for 380 auctions for new
Palm Pilot M515 handheld PDA that transacted on eBay between March and May,
2003. Each bidding record includes the auction ID, the starting and closing times
and prices, all bids with associated time stamps, and other information such as
auction duration, shipping fee, seller’s feedback score, whether the seller is a power
seller, whether the product is from an eBay store, and whether the auction descrip-
tions include a picture. Table A.1 presents summary statistics for these variables.
A.1.2 Laptop Data
The data set contains information on 4,965 laptop auctions that took place on
eBay between May and June, 2004. Table A.2 summarizes the data which include
products of a wide variety of makes and models. We can see that the data include
over 7 different brands, and for each brand laptops differ further in terms of their
memory size, screen size, processor speed, whether they are a new or used product,
and whether or not they include an Intel chip or a DVD player.
169
Table A.1: Description of the Palm auctions. The top panel reports statistics for all
continuous variables; the bottom panel reports statistics for all discrete variables.
Variable Mean (Stdev) Median Min Max
OpeningPrice $76.67 (92.45) $9.99 $0.01 $265
ClosingPrice $229.45 (22.00) $232.50 $172.50 $290
AuctionLength 5.74 (1.79) 7 3 10
NumberOfBids 17.45 (11.23) 17.50 1 54
NumberOfBidders 8.92 (5.13) 9 1 23
ShippingFee $15.44 (5.51) $15 $0 $50





The data set also contains information regards auction setting. For instance,
Buy-It-Now auctions are listings that have the option of a fixed-price transaction
and thus forego the auction mechanism. Over 20% of the laptop auctions included
that feature. Moreover, a secret reserve price is a floor price below which the seller
is not required to sell. This feature is particularly popular for high-value auctions.
Roughly 30% of all laptop auctions make use of the secret reserve price feature.
We can see that auctions in this dataset are of a wide variety in terms of
product features and auction setting. This is also reflected in the wide range of
number of bids (between 6 and 115), bidders (6 and 30), and closing prices (between
$445 and $1,000).
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Table A.2: Summary statistics of the laptop auctions. The top two panels report
statistics for auction features. The bottom three panels report summary statistics
on the product characteristics.
Variable Mean(Stdev) Median Min Max
OpeningPrice 93.31(159.54) 9.99 0.01 900
ClosingPrice 499.22(210.26) 445 200 999.99
AuctionLength 5.00(1.81) 5 3 7
NumberOfBids 21.13(11.05) 19 6 115






Brand(count) HP(1347); IBM(705); Sony(307);
Toshiba(535); Other(229)
Variable Mean(Stdev) Median Min Max
MemorySize 269.12(157.78) 256 64 2000
ScreenSize 14.03(0.92) 14 12 21






A.2 Transactions Data from A Grocery Products Distributor
We use the transaction data from one of the leading grocery products distrib-
utors during in our study. The data set includes all transactions that took place
during January 2007 to August 2008. Each transaction record contains information
about the involved sales division ID, sales representative (referred to as “salesrep”)
ID, customer ID, product ID, product category, commodityflag (perishable com-
modities or non-commodity), quantity ordered, invoice date, cost, transacted price,
and for many transactions, the recommended price.
We divide the remaining transactions after performing series of data reduction
procedures into two data sets (see Section 6.2.2 for details). The first one (referred
to as Set.1) includes transactions with DST price recommendations, and the other
data set (referred to Set.2) has no price recommendation information provided for
corresponding transactions. We provide summary statistics for both data sets below.
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Simulation Results for Alternate Bidding Schemes
B.1 Alternate Bidding Heuristics
In this section we investigate alternative bidding heuristics to those discussed
in Sections 2.5.2.1 (early bidding) and 2.5.2.2 (last minute bidding). These heuristics
are based either on price trends that bidders observe in auctions that closed recently,
or on strategies to shade bids below what one believes a good is worth. Table B.1
shows the results.
The top panel in Table B.1 shows the results of using recent price trends for
making bidding decisions. Assume that a bidder wants to place a bid and that
s/he has monitored prices of the n auctions that closed most recently (we choose
n=10 here but the results do not change much for different values of n). The bidder
then bids the minimum (we also investigate the mean or the maximum) of the n
closing prices (as long as the minimum is smaller than his/her WTP). The bidder
can place the bid any time before the auction closes. We can see from the table
that this heuristic performs worse than early or last minute bidding. It is curious
that bidding the mean results in the highest expected surplus (as it increases the
chances of winning).
The bottom panel shows the result of early bidding (i.e. bidding on day one),
but shading one’s bid below what one really thinks the item is worth. In other
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words, rather than bidding one’s WTP, one only bids a fraction, e.g. 90% or 80%.
The results show that while shading increases the average surplus, it reduces the
expected surplus as the probability of winning decreases. In fact, shading at 70% or
below (not shown here) results in zero expected surplus.
Table B.1: Alternative bidding heuristics.
RECENT PRICE TRENDS
Heuristic p.win avg.sur exp.sur
mean 44% (2%) $8.86 ($0.28) $3.90
min 11% (0.2%) $35.11 ($0.22) $3.86
max 57% (40%) $2.75 ($2.35) $1.57
BID SHADING
Heuristic p.win avg.sur exp.sur
100%WTP 53% (2%) $18.85 ($0.57) $9.90
90%WTP 20% (1%) $19.20 ($0.50) $3.80
80%WTP 3.5% (0.4%) $19.13 ($0.58) $0.67
B.2 Robustness of Last-Minute Bidding
Last-minute bidders place an incremental bid over the current high-bid and we
assume in Section 2.5.2.2 that this increment equals 2%. In practice, this increment
could be larger or smaller; it could also be that some last-minute bidders increment
not by a percentage of the current price but rather by a fixed amount. Table B.2
investigate that robustness of last-minute bidding to different increment strategies.
We can see that the expected surplus is rather unaffected by the increment strat-
egy. Moreover, regardless of the actual strategy chosen, the expected surplus is
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significantly lower than that of our automated bidding strategy in Table 2.6.
Table B.2: Robustness of last-minute bidding to different increments.
Increment p.win avg.sur exp.sur
$0.50 86.26% $18.73 $16.16
$1 89.38% $18.61 $16.63
$2 92.50% $18.44 $17.06
$5 96.43% $17.39 $16.77
0.5% 89.82% $18.58 $16.69
1% 92.34% $18.47 $17.06
2% 95.19% $17.97 $17.11
5% 98.03% $15.97 $15.65
176
Appendix C
Model Selection Results for Palm Data Set from eBay
In the following we list the complete model selection results for Chapter 3. We
refer to each variable according to its index from Table 3.1. We arrange the results
by the total number of variables in the model. We start with models containing only
one parameter (Table C.1) followed by 2-parameter models (Table C.2 and C.3) and
so on. The first column either refers to the variables entering the model (“Var-In”)
or to the variables leaving the model (“Var-Out”). For instance, Var-In=1 means
that the model contains only one variable, variable #1, i.e. Price; on the other hand
Var-Out={1,6} means that all variables but #1 and #6 enter the model. We report
result for both AIC and BIC. The highlighted number refers to the best model in
each column.
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Table C.1: 1-Parameter Models
BIC
Var-In BICavg BICsd BICmed BICmin BICmax BICmean+sd
1 -25.776 25.551 -18.542 -85.033 2.344 -0.225
2 76.872 7.207 76.907 63.877 86.821 84.079
3 75.497 7.426 75.649 61.191 85.605 82.923
4 77.419 7.341 77.445 63.896 87.132 84.761
5 76.316 8.178 76.137 62.176 87.097 84.494
6 63.389 9.109 64.236 46.861 75.340 72.498
AIC
Var-In AICavg AICsd AICmed AICmin AICmax AICmean+sd
1 -27.690 25.708 -20.259 -87.215 0.564 -1.982
2 74.958 6.999 74.967 62.332 84.639 81.958
3 73.584 7.219 73.753 59.646 83.423 80.803
4 75.506 7.134 75.556 62.351 84.950 82.640
5 74.402 7.971 74.204 60.631 84.915 82.373
6 61.475 8.914 62.347 45.316 73.158 70.390
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Table C.2: 2-Parameter Models
BIC
Var-In BICavg BICsd BICmed BICmin BICmax BICmean+sd
1,2 -114.085 57.220 -93.854 -239.185 -49.978 -56.865
1,3 -24.199 24.837 -16.351 -82.753 0.632 0.638
1,4 -26.161 27.113 -18.200 -92.598 3.717 0.952
1,5 -30.775 25.800 -25.350 -88.866 -3.988 -4.975
1,6 -29.101 25.695 -22.984 -87.808 -0.685 -3.406
2,3 77.037 7.158 77.618 63.960 86.975 84.195
2,4 79.770 7.286 79.843 66.646 89.812 87.056
2,5 78.050 7.849 79.038 62.783 87.630 85.899
2,6 62.095 7.572 61.824 48.378 73.069 69.667
3,4 78.014 7.554 78.307 63.956 88.499 85.569
3,5 76.641 8.712 77.027 62.426 88.427 85.353
3,6 64.874 9.077 66.068 47.237 76.699 73.951
4,5 79.075 8.232 79.092 64.633 89.766 87.308
4,6 65.688 8.650 67.086 49.282 76.466 74.338
5,6 64.892 9.820 64.682 48.410 78.348 74.712
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Table C.3: 2-Parameter Models (Continued)
AIC
Var-In AICavg AICsd AICmed AICmin AICmax AICmean+sd
1,2 -116.956 57.478 -96.688 -242.458 -52.295 -59.478
1,3 -27.069 25.074 -18.926 -86.026 -2.039 -1.995
1,4 -29.032 27.338 -20.776 -95.871 1.046 -1.694
1,5 -33.646 26.041 -28.184 -92.139 -6.975 -7.605
1,6 -31.971 25.935 -25.895 -91.081 -3.356 -6.036
2,3 74.166 6.845 74.707 61.642 83.702 81.012
2,4 76.900 6.974 76.933 64.328 86.539 83.874
2,5 75.179 7.539 76.147 60.465 84.357 82.718
2,6 59.225 7.273 59.072 46.061 69.796 66.497
3,4 75.144 7.243 75.397 61.638 85.226 82.387
3,5 73.770 8.402 74.116 60.108 85.154 82.173
3,6 62.003 8.788 63.235 44.919 73.426 70.791
4,5 76.205 7.921 76.202 62.315 86.492 84.125
4,6 62.817 8.360 64.253 46.964 73.193 71.177
5,6 62.021 9.520 61.849 46.092 75.075 71.541
180
Table C.4: 3-Parameter Models
BIC
Var-In BICavg BICsd BICmed BICmin BICmax BICmean+sd
1,2,3 -208.007 87.681 -181.948 -408.558 -112.873 -120.326
1,2,4 -113.451 56.865 -92.923 -238.490 -48.223 -56.586
1,2,5 -111.473 57.089 -91.846 -236.673 -47.215 -54.384
1,2,6 -112.476 57.021 -92.295 -237.843 -49.259 -55.455
1,3,4 -24.159 27.511 -15.797 -92.154 3.368 3.352
1,3,5 -28.341 25.398 -22.487 -85.895 -4.015 -2.942
1,3,6 -28.030 25.109 -21.658 -86.657 -2.782 -2.922
1,4,5 -32.652 29.324 -23.882 -102.382 -5.608 -3.328
1,4,6 -28.732 26.553 -21.165 -92.875 0.533 -2.178
1,5,6 -33.836 26.719 -29.757 -92.583 -5.850 -7.117
2,3,4 79.712 7.398 80.456 66.714 90.001 87.110
2,3,5 78.373 7.843 79.864 64.719 88.678 86.216
2,3,6 61.821 7.383 61.630 48.368 71.884 69.204
2,4,5 80.921 7.926 82.007 65.501 90.502 88.847
2,4,6 64.915 7.610 64.528 51.142 75.998 72.525
2,5,6 63.645 6.939 64.148 50.369 72.967 70.585
3,4,5 79.198 8.845 79.581 65.182 91.357 88.043
3,4,6 66.870 9.061 68.611 49.299 78.472 75.931
3,5,6 65.736 10.052 65.628 48.849 79.785 75.788
4,5,6 67.182 9.321 67.475 50.786 79.550 76.503
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Table C.5: 3-Parameter Models (Continued)
AIC
Var-In AICavg AICsd AICmed AICmin AICmax AICmean+sd
1,2,3 -211.835 88.028 -185.726 -412.922 -115.963 -123.807
1,2,4 -117.279 57.211 -96.701 -242.854 -51.313 -60.068
1,2,5 -115.300 57.432 -95.623 -241.038 -50.305 -57.868
1,2,6 -116.304 57.365 -96.072 -242.207 -52.349 -58.939
1,3,4 -27.987 27.810 -19.231 -96.519 -0.194 -0.176
1,3,5 -32.168 25.722 -26.265 -90.259 -7.998 -6.446
1,3,6 -31.858 25.432 -25.435 -91.021 -6.343 -6.426
1,4,5 -36.479 29.637 -27.659 -106.746 -9.169 -6.843
1,4,6 -32.559 26.863 -24.942 -97.239 -3.028 -5.696
1,5,6 -37.664 27.045 -33.534 -96.947 -9.833 -10.618
2,3,4 75.884 6.983 76.575 63.624 85.637 82.868
2,3,5 74.545 7.429 75.984 61.628 84.313 81.975
2,3,6 57.993 6.982 57.852 45.278 67.520 64.975
2,4,5 77.094 7.513 78.127 62.411 86.138 84.607
2,4,6 61.088 7.210 60.859 48.052 71.634 68.298
2,5,6 59.818 6.539 60.268 47.279 68.603 66.357
3,4,5 75.370 8.434 75.701 62.092 86.993 83.804
3,4,6 63.042 8.676 64.833 46.209 74.108 71.718
3,5,6 61.909 9.648 61.850 45.759 75.421 71.556
4,5,6 63.354 8.920 63.697 47.696 75.185 72.274
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Table C.6: 4-Parameter Models
BIC
Var-Out BICavg BICsd BICmed BICmin BICmax BICmean+sd
1,2 67.729 9.895 67.866 50.852 81.559 77.625
1,3 66.448 6.995 67.066 53.088 75.785 73.443
1,4 63.532 6.833 64.522 50.471 72.770 70.365
1,5 64.586 7.548 64.471 51.048 74.975 72.135
1,6 80.839 7.899 82.326 67.264 91.005 88.738
2,3 -34.928 29.551 -28.119 -103.651 -6.496 -5.376
2,4 -31.774 26.342 -26.982 -90.227 -6.580 -5.431
2,5 -27.139 27.215 -18.980 -93.707 -0.039 0.075
2,6 -30.190 29.613 -21.378 -100.547 -3.206 -0.576
3,4 -109.798 56.842 -90.000 -235.007 -46.523 -52.956
3,5 -111.785 56.642 -91.335 -237.113 -47.604 -55.142
3,6 -110.999 56.643 -91.755 -235.400 -45.450 -54.356
4,5 -207.081 87.945 -181.266 -407.868 -111.583 -119.136
4,6 -210.277 85.124 -191.714 -405.526 -115.430 -125.153
5,6 -208.289 87.163 -184.485 -405.962 -110.488 -121.126
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Table C.7: 4-Parameter Models (Continued)
AIC
Var-Out AICavg AICsd AICmed AICmin AICmax AICmean+sd
1,2 62.945 9.392 63.144 46.989 76.104 72.337
1,3 61.663 6.493 62.216 49.225 70.329 68.156
1,4 58.747 6.327 59.800 46.608 67.315 65.074
1,5 59.802 7.045 59.749 47.185 69.520 66.847
1,6 76.055 7.385 77.476 63.401 85.549 83.439
2,3 -39.712 29.953 -32.842 -109.106 -10.948 -9.759
2,4 -36.558 26.756 -31.704 -95.682 -10.443 -9.802
2,5 -31.924 27.603 -23.702 -99.162 -4.490 -4.321
2,6 -34.974 30.005 -26.100 -106.002 -7.658 -4.969
3,4 -114.583 57.271 -94.723 -240.462 -50.386 -57.311
3,5 -116.569 57.075 -96.058 -242.568 -51.467 -59.495
3,6 -115.783 57.076 -96.477 -240.855 -49.313 -58.707
4,5 -211.865 88.378 -185.988 -413.323 -115.446 -123.487
4,6 -215.061 85.559 -196.436 -410.981 -119.293 -129.502
5,6 -213.073 87.601 -189.207 -411.417 -114.351 -125.472
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Table C.8: 5-Parameter Models
BIC
Var-Out BICavg BICsd BICmed BICmin BICmax BICmean+sd
1 66.099 6.793 67.370 53.059 74.726 72.891
2 -32.716 30.131 -25.356 -102.939 -4.412 -2.585
3 -109.312 56.516 -89.763 -234.093 -44.836 -52.797
4 -209.338 85.305 -190.885 -405.091 -114.107 -124.033
5 -207.639 87.338 -184.281 -405.246 -109.120 -120.302
6 -210.303 84.335 -193.161 -402.879 -112.897 -125.968
AIC
Var-Out AICavg AICsd AICmed AICmin AICmax AICmean+sd
1 60.357 6.185 61.703 48.423 68.180 66.543
2 -38.457 30.614 -31.022 -109.486 -9.754 -7.843
3 -115.054 57.035 -95.430 -240.639 -49.471 -58.019
4 -215.080 85.827 -196.551 -411.637 -118.743 -129.252
5 -213.381 87.864 -189.947 -411.792 -113.755 -125.517
6 -216.044 84.864 -198.827 -409.426 -117.532 -131.180
Table C.9: 6-Parameter Models
BIC
Var-Out BICavg BICsd BICmed BICmin BICmax BICmean+sd
None -209.820 84.406 -192.966 -402.228 -111.517 -125.415
AIC
Var-Out AICavg AICsd AICmed AICmin AICmax AICmean+sd
None -216.519 85.023 -199.577 -409.865 -116.925 -131.495
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